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Exile and Re-establishment:
Scotland from the Crowning of Robert I until the
death of Edward I.
The years 1306 and 1307 saw the beginning of a new phase in the Scottish Wars of Independence, often referred to as the Bruce-Balliol civil war. With Alexander III deposed by Edward and exiled to France, there was little hope for the nationalist cause. The situation, however, changed with the murder of John Comyn at the hands of Robert Bruce on 4th February, 1306 and the coronation of the latter at Scone on March 25th of that year. Although Robert received some support among the Scots, he was soon driven into exile following two disastrous defeats. Although humiliatingly defeated, this did not discourage Robert, who was able to re-establish himself in the southwest by the death of Edward I in July 1307. Apart from pure chance, the reason for Robert’s success in 1307, in contrast to his defeats the previous year, was his change in tactics. Extensive losses in 1306 forced Robert to abandon the traditional strategy of fortifying his position, fighting in open combat and capturing new strongholds to a more pragmatic approach of guerilla warfare, attrition, and a scorched earth policy which included seizing and dismantling all fortified positions.
Surveying the political scene in Scotland at the time of Robert’s coronation, it is difficult, if not impossible, to say that the odds were in his favor. A list prepared by Barron gives a good idea of most of Bruce’s support by the battle of Methven, including: bishops Lamberton, Wishart, and Murray; earls of Atholl, Mentieth and Lennox; along with James the Stewart, Simon Fraser, James Douglas, Neil Campbell, Gilbert de la Hay and the MacDonald Angus Og.[1] Although this may sound impressive at first, they account for less than one third of the magnates, with many more in staunch opposition, such as the Earls of Sutherland, Ross, Buchan, Angus, Dunbar, much of Galloway, and the MacDougalls in the west, to say nothing of the English. These men held most of the wealth and military might in the country, and while most did not harbor pro-English sentiments, they were not prepared to recognize and support what they viewed as a Bruce usurpation of the throne. Many, such as the MacDougalls and the Earl of Strathearn, were related to the Balliol-Comyn family, the largest political coalition at that time, and were naturally still displeased with John Comyn’s murderer, driving them into alliance with the English. Thus the results of the events in early 1306 were to split the nationalist cause into two opposing camps. It is for this reason that Bruce’s kingship and actions cannot be initially viewed as a rising of the community of the realm, which had protected Scottish sovereignty since the death of Alexander III.
Robert’s support, unlike the community of the realm, consisted of a group of individuals supporting Robert for their own reasons. Although personal and territorial ties to Robert motivated much crucial support, others did so out of patriotism, detestation of the English administration, opportunism, and the possibility for advancement, such as James Douglas. The Bruce also gained support through mutual enemies, such as the MacDonald rivals of the pro-Balliol MacDougalls. With outcomes uncertain, many sat on the fence, looking for which way to jump. Even the most steadfast patriots were faced with the problem so well stated by Grant:
“Scots who were uncommitted to
either faction now faced a cruel dilemma. To support the
patriotic cause meant supporting a usurper against the legitimate
king, to support the legitimate king meant supporting the allies
of the English against those who were fighting for
independence.”[2]
In short,
Robert faced serious challenges if he was going to neutralize his
enemies and convince undecideds of his legitimacy and chances of
success.
From the murder of John Comyn until the Battle of Methven, Robert
pursued a strategy typical for someone of his rank and time.
He concentrated first on the southwest, capturing castles at
Dumfries, Dalswinton, Ayr, Rothesay, and Tibbers while
provisioning and fortifying Dunaverty and Loch Doon.[3] Although this was
partially intended to prevent a Comyn-Balliol response by
suppressing the chiefs in Galloway, it also consolidated
Robert’s hold on the southwest. By stocking these
castles and placing garrisons in them, one can deduce that Robert
was planning a conventional war of sieges and territorial
advancements. Following the coronation, Robert secured
Dundee while Atholl took Brechin and Bishop Wishart, an avid
patriot and strong Bruce supporter, used wood given to him by the
English for his bell-tower to construct a siege engine, attacking
castle Kirkintilloch and seizing the royal castle at Cupar.[4] Making one more
trip to the south, Robert soon headed north to Aberdeen and
perhaps to Banff, adding recruits and subjugating lords. This
three-month period was thus characterized by a traditional
consolidation of power and a swift, if not frantic attempt to
defuse any counterattack before such an assault could be mounted.
Although in some respects atypical, the example of Bruce’s dealings with the Earl of Strathearn at this time are illustrative of the strong-armed means Robert was willing to employ to gain submission of his rivals. Earl Malise was a patriot who had raided Northumberland with Wallace but who had cooperated with the English since 1303 when the last of his sons was taken prisoner.[5] He was further estranged from Robert through his marriage to the Comyn earl of Buchan’s sister. Despite this, Robert wrote to him by way of the Abbot Maurice of Inchaffray following his coronation, requesting homage.[6] When Strathearn refused, having already sworn fealty to Edward, Robert invaded with the earl of Atholl and besieged Fowlis castle. Malise agreed to meet with Robert under the promise of safe conduct near Crieff, “Because he feared for his lands, for his body and for his life.”[7] Robert’s violent methods continued when on the second day of meetings he seized Strathearn on the advice of Atholl after he once again refused homage. Strathearn was taken to the Isle of Inchmahome with Sir Robert Boyd, where he finally submitted only after threat of a traitor’s death and loss of property. Once home safe, the earl refused to aid Robert, who invaded once again upon intercepting a message promising support to Robert’s enemies. It is improbable that Robert dealt with all dissention in such a manner; his abuse of Malise was undoubtedly intended as a warning to others. Although such a policy could backfire on Robert, strong leadership was required if he were to keep the throne and such tactics were not unthinkable in the age of Edward I.
The English king was at first in disbelief over the situation in Scotland, writing, “Certain Scots in malice have slain John Comyn.”[8] By April 5th, however, Edward had appointed Sir Aymer de Valence, brother-in-law to John Comyn, as his special lieutenant in Scotland. Valence was given support and ordered to, “burn and slay and raise [the] dragon [banner],” proclaiming no mercy.[9] Valence swept north, receiving the surrender of Bishop Lamberton of St Andrews, who had been ‘harried’ into supporting Robert yet sent his men off to him regardless, and capturing Bishop Wishart at Cupar, sending both men southward.[10] Valence having secured Perth, the Bruce marched south to meet him, confident of a victory in open combat. On the 18th of June, however, Valence took Robert by surprise in the early morning when portions of his company were out foraging or at separate quarters. The ensuing loss was nothing short of a rout for Robert, and he may have received much better results were he alert and had he lured Valence into a trap or at least favorable positioning. Oddly enough, as Barrow points out, a victory for Robert at Methven would have resulted in a showdown between Robert and Edward I, the results of which would be fatal for Robert. All in all, Robert’s traditional strategy thus far had lead to the recapture of several strongholds by the opposition and left him fleeing with a few hundred followers into the hills.
Although Bruce’s actions were brutal at times, they paled in comparison with his adversaries. With Scotland so thoroughly divided, Edward felt free to crush Bruce’s supporters with the full faith that the opposition would support him. Many captured at Methven were executed at Berwick and Newcastle; notable executions including Simon Fraser, who shared William Wallace’s fate and whose head was place next to his on London bridge, and the earl of Athol, first man of his rank executed in England for 230 years.[11] As for the women, Bruce’s sister and Countess Isabel of Buchan were placed in cages; such was the price of ‘treason’ against Edward. The effect of such harsh measures was to make painstakingly clear the price of opposition to Edward, and effect that would constrain Bruce’s recruitment until Edward’s death.
Calculating his best chances of escape to be in the west, Bruce
fled in that direction until the men of Lorn under the probable
leadership of John MacDougall blocked him at Dalry, the head of
Strathfillan. Although Fordun places the date of the Battle
of Dalry on August 11th, Barrow insists that it must
have been in July to account for Valence’s presence in
Aberdeen in pursuit of Bruce’s wife.[12] Either way, the battle was the second
crushing defeat for Bruce in a row and left him fleeing in such
desperation that Barbour’s verses cannot be much of an
exaggeration. Bruce, aided by the earl of Lennox and Neil
Campbell, fled across Lennox and Loch Lomond to Castle Dunaverty.[13] Despite the
strong local support in Kintyre –Angus Og, James Stewart and
possibly Robert had lands there- Bruce stayed at Dunaverty for
only a few days before fleeing, the castle under siege from
September 22nd. Robert’s plans, by this
point, had been an abject failure. He had suffered two
ruinous defeats, was driven from his kingdom, his wife was
captured in route to Orkney, and most of his followers had been
killed or imprisoned. Things did not look well for the rex
scotorum.
There are a number of theories where Robert went during the winter of 1306, and though it may never be known for certain, Barrow’s explanation is the best reasoned.[14] Although some accounts have Robert traveling to Norway and to Orkney, the latter of which remains a possibility as Ranald Nicholson suggests, it is highly unlikely that Robert traveled so far as his sister’s Norwegian kingdom.[15] Robert was supported by the MacDonald Angus Og and Christiana of the Isles, the sole legitimate heir to Bruce’s relative, Lord Garmoran. He also possessed claims to Irish lands as lord of Carrick and the son-in-law of the Earl of Ulster, and would undoubtedly have found support and refuge with the Bissets of the Glens of Antrim on account of their alliance with the MacDonalds against the MacDougalls. A stay in Ireland and the isles is consistent with Guisborough’s assertion the Bruce returned with Scots and Irish to Carrick to collect rents[16] (he likely only sent followers) as well as Lanercost’s statement that Bruce resided in “the furthermost isles of that country.”[17] Bruce’s lands and familial ties all lay on the southwest and he consistently looked west for support. From the moment of Comyn’s murder he looked west, fortifying his position there and keeping the route open to Ireland. This outlook proved much to his advantage, since the west was both a fertile grounds for recruitment and the best haven for refugees, far as it was from the centers of authority and English occupation.
Whatever his faults, one must admire Robert’s courage and determination in returning to Scotland in the first months of 1307. Still, it seems unlikely that he would have done so had he thought that all hope was lost, especially with settlement in Ireland and Norway as alternative options. Yet in order to gain everything, one must risk everything, and risk everything Robert did. He split his forces in two, sending his brothers Thomas and Alexander with eighteen ships to Galloway, where they were surprised by Dougal MacDowall at Loch Ryan on February 9th and defeated.[18] The situation elsewhere was grim: Tibbers and Loch Doon Castle had fallen, and Carrick was firmly in the hands of Henry Percy, who occupied Turnberry Castle. Landing in Carrick on account of a false signal fire, Bruce found himself in a forlorn situation and in desperation attacked the village of Turnberry. Strengthened by the word of Edward’s illness at Lanercost, Bruce made what Barrow calls the “simple but momentous decision which changed the whole course and character of the war.”[19] This was not, it must be stressed, not so much of a change of strategy so much it was an acceptance of the situation before him. While Barrow was certainly right in identifying Bruce’s recognition that the English would always have superior cavalry and siege machinery, his assertions that Bruce was the first leader to accept this and that Bruce believed in “the supreme virtue of guerrilla warfare” until Bannockburn deserve a second glance.[20] First off, guerrilla tactics had been employed before during the Wars of Independence, although they were a rarity for a man of Bruce’s status. Furthermore, that Bruce somehow saw this type of warfare as ‘virtuous’ is highly unlikely. As a noble member of the military aristocracy, Bruce would have likely viewed such actions as questionable at best, but was unable to apply traditional warfare effectively. These problems aside, the observation that “speed, surprise, mobility, small-scale engagements, scorched earth and dismantling of fortresses – these were to be the hallmarks of [Bruce’s] campaign” is essentially correct.[21] It was Robert’s willingness to employ them that won him the kingdom.
Bruce spent the next few months in Carrick and Galloway, engaging in small-scale attacks and attempting to draw supporters. In April, while hiding in the Glen of Trool, Robert’s forces ambushed and defeated an English force, inflicting heavy losses upon them. Moving north, he encountered Valence, leader of Edward’s forces in Scotland and victor of Methven, at Loudoun Hill on 10 May. Bruce’s choice of terrain minimized the effects of Valence’s cavalry and resulted in driving them back to Bothwell. There is also evidence to suggest that Robert may have been after the Treasurer of England and his cash, since he was reportedly with Valence at the time.[22]
Roberts tactics were practiced among his followers, as is evidence of James Douglas’ capture of Douglas castle by a trick, “slight[ing] it and sen[ding] the garrison back to Clifford,” before heading back to Robert in the west. Three days after Loudoun, Robert beat Raoul de Monthermer, driving him back to Ayr. These were crucial, albeit small victories for Robert. The effect was nothing less than to overturn the effects of Methven and Dalry, showing that Robert is not only tremendously devoted and courageous, but that he could in fact defeat his enemies. The situation as of May 15th is summed up a Scots lord sympathetic to the English:
“I hear
that Bruce never had the good will of his own followers or of the
people generally so much with him as now. It appears that
God is with him, for he has destroyed King Edward’s power
both among English and Scots. The people believe that Bruce
will carry all before him, exhorted by ‘false
preachers’ from Bruce’s army.”[23]
Bibliography
Barron, Evan MacLeod. The Scottish War of Independence. New York: Barnes & Noble
Inc., 1997.
Barrow, Geoffrey W.S. Robert Bruce
& the Community of the Realm of Scotland.
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999.
Duncan, A.A.M. “The War of the
Scots, 1306-23.” Transactions of the Royal
Historical
Society. (1992), pp. 125-151.
Grant, Alexander. Independence and Nationhood: Scotland 1306-1469. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1996.
McDonald, R. Andrew. The Kingdom of
the Isles: Scotland’s Western Seaboard, c.
1100-c.1336. East Linton, Scotland: Tuckwell Press Ltd., 1997.
Neville, Cynthia J. “The Political Allegiance of the Earls of Strathearn during the War of
Independence.” The Scottish Historical Review. Vol. LXV 2, Nr. 180. (Oct
1986), pp. 133-153.
Oram, R.D. “Bruce, Balliol and the Lordship of Galloway: the south-west of Scotland
and the Wars of Independence.” Transactions of the Dumfriesshire and Galloway Society. 4th Series. (1992), pp. 29-47.
[1] Barron, Evan
MacLeod. The Scottish War of Independence. New
York: Barnes & Noble Inc., 1997. pp. 224-35.
[2] Grant, Alexander.
Independence and Nationhood: Scotland 1306-1469. Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1996. p. 4.
[3] Barrow, Geoffrey W.S. Robert Bruce & the Community of the Realm of Scotland. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999. pp. 148-9.
[4] Ibid, p. 152.
[5] Neville, Cynthia J.
“The Political Allegiance of the Earls of Strathearn during
the War of Independence.” The Scottish Historical
Review. Vol. LXV 2, Nr. 180. (Oct 1986) p. 142.
[6] Ibid, p. 144.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Barrow, p. 153.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Duncan, A.A.M. “The War of the
Scots, 1306-23.” Transactions of the Royal
Historical Society. (1992), pp. 125-151. p. 137.
[11] Athol did, on account of being a distant relation of Edward’s, receive the honour of being hanged from higher gallows than all the rest. Barrow, p. 161.
[12] Ibid, pp. 160-161.
[13] McDonald, R. Andrew. The Kingdom
of the Isles: Scotland’s Western Seaboard, c. 1100-c.1336.
East Linton, Scotland: Tuckwell Press Ltd., 1997.
p. 172.
[14] Barrow, pp. 166-168.
[15] McDonald, p. 174.
[16] Barrow, p. 169.
[17] Ibid, p. 166.
[18] Oram, R.D. “Bruce, Balliol and
the Lordship of Galloway: the south-west of Scotland and the Wars
of Independence.” Transactions of the Dumfriesshire
and Galloway Society. 4th Series.
(1992). p. 39.
[19] Barrow, p. 171.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Duncan, p. 138.
[23] Barrow, p. 172.