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Free Will
Ryan Renfro
How can one believe that God exists if evil also exists? This was the problem presented by Epicurus to the monotheistic religions of the ancient near east. Epicurus stated that God is all-powerful, omniscient, perfectly good, and exists. However, evil also exists; and since a completely good and all-powerful God could not allow evil to exist, there must be no God, or at least a God with these qualities. Many have come up with responses to this problem, the best of which is the argument of free will; however, every solution seems to have problems of its own. Is it then completely irrational to believe in the existence of a perfect God? It is not irrational to hold such a belief; indeed many rational humans have believed in a perfect God, but the problem of evil challenges the possibility of God’s existence which does not appear to be able to be rationally upheld even by the free will argument.
To begin with it may be best to lay down some sort of
understanding of evil. This of course leads to the problem
that not everyone has the same definition of evil, and that what
one may consider to be evil, another may consider not to be.
This aside, evil can be divided into two categories: moral
evil, that being an evil which is done by humans and is
contingent upon their actions, and natural evil, being
occurrences such as floods and other events that are out of human
control. This would seem to suggest that there are two
different authors of evil, one being man and the other nature,
which, if he is all-powerful, is controlled by God.
What, however, is
the nature of good and evil. Does one exist apart from the
other? At first glance it would appear that both are
necessary to distinguish one from the other, since it would be
almost impossible to know what good is without knowing what evil
is. An elephant, for example, can only be said to be large
if there is a mouse compare it with. This would make good
and therefore God depend upon the existence of evil, which he
cannot be because he must exist necessarily and not be contingent
upon anything. Augustine offers a solution by suggesting
that good is something which exists, and evil is something
lacking that existence, or rather lacking good. This could
be compared to hot and cold. A substance needs to have a
certain amount of heat in order to make it hot, but it is not
made cold by having a certain amount of cool because there is no
such thing as cool, it just lacks heat as evil lacks good. But
why should this be the nature of evil? It seems that this
definition of the relationship between good and evil, as a
intermediate principle, has been deducted from the existence of
God. “If God exists then the nature of good and evil
must be like this in order for God to exist”. This
argues for the existence of God on the claim that the nature of
good and evil is as Augustine suggested and must be if God is to
exist. But if the nature of good and evil is indeed not as
Augustine suggested , and for example both exist, as one would
most likely be lead to believe, were he not arguing for the
existence of God, then Augustine’s argument would have a
false premises and thus be unsound. Since evil cannot be
the creation of a perfect God and since God would not be
all-powerful if there where something other than and not subject
to control by him, the only way in which the Judeo-Christian idea
of God can possibly be reconciled with the existence of evil is
if Augustine’s belief of the nature of evil is true. Augustine’s
idea will therefore be used as the nature of evil in all
forthcoming arguments because if it is incorrect then
Epicure’s argument or the problem of evil is correct and
this God cannot exist.
There have been
many suggestions presented as solutions to this problem, most of
which provide and excuse for the existence of evil, such as that
evil is a means by which good can be accomplished. This
argument would go something like this: Although many
soldiers died in the invasion of Europe, it was a needed it order
to accomplish a greater good, i.e. the disposition of Hitler.
This has not solved the problem because evil still exists, as it
only states that some evils are necessary to prevent greater
evils. Just like the arguments that evil is needed to
appreciate good and build character traights, this argument does
not deal with the fact that evil, indeed any evil, is a problem
if one is to say that there is a perfectly good and all-powerful
God. What is therefore needed is an explanation of how God
and any evil can exist simultaneously. God must not be the
author of evil, so the responsibility must be shifted to
something else which is subject to God but is responsible for
it’s own actions.
The only solution
which truly deals with the root of the problem is the argument of
free will. This states that God gave man free will so that
he may choose between good and evil, which then shifts the
accountability for the existence of evil from God to mankind.
In this way evil would not result from a God who was all good and
instead from humans who have the choice of being either good or
evil. This would seem to be the only solution with a
possibility at solving the problem, however, it does have its own
problems that must first be dealt with.
The first
implication of the free will defense is that because it is
mandatory for human beings to have free will in order to be moral
agents, then it seems that God to would have to have free will,
not only for him to be a moral agent but because he would not
very well be all-powerful if he did not posses the same free will
as part of his creation. This does not appear to fit with
the all-good definition of him because how can something be
all-good and be able to do evil as well? If the possibility
exists that God can do something which is evil, and God exists
eternally, then don’t the chances of God doing evil become
so high that just about the only way in which God could not do
something evil would be if he was incapable of doing it, in which
case he would not posses free will? A reply to this is that God,
being omniscient, would know everything and therefore be able to
always choose to do good, and since he always chooses to do good,
he is thus completely good. Also, the argument of the
chances of him doing evil is perhaps not the best way to look at
the history of God’s actions. If his actions are
indeed truly free, then it does not seem logical that they would
somehow be dependent upon the world, which he possess ultimate
power over, as would be the case with a flipped coin which is
affected by the wind and countless other temporal factors. An
all-powerful and omniscient God would possess the ability to
always make the right decision and is therefore not subject to
that equation of possibilities that states if something can
happen, sooner or later it will happen assuming an infinite
amount of time.
Another question
which arises out of the free will defense is why did God grand
man free will? It is certainly not so that man could do
evil, so it must be so that he can do good, thus the ability to
do good necessitates the possibility of doing evil. But why
can we not always do good like God? A traditional reply as
to why God granted free will is that we are being tested by him
to see if we are worthy. But if God is omniscient,
why is he testing man? It doesn’t seem to make any
sense to test something if you are already completely sure of the
test’s outcome due to divine forthknowledge, not to mention
have complete control of the experiment and the power to change
the outcome at any time. Besides, it seems to be of
questionable morality to test people without obtaining their
consent. Few people would voluntarily enter a world filled
with evil and suffering if given the choice between it and a
perfect world. Even if this test is the only way to obtain
some eternal reward, it would only be that way because the
creator created the universe in this fashion, which seems somehow
unnecessary. It would be only reasonable that a being with
God’s characteristics would not just take someone aside, let
them be rapped and then shot in exchange for free will and then
give them ten million dollars, but instead would just give them
the money and prevent the evil from being done to them, or at
least offer them the money if they would be willing to be so
sorely wronged. At any rate, the testing theory looks
unnecessary at best, and may be entirely out of character for an
all-powerful and good god at best.
A problem also
arises if one accepts the distinction between the two different
types of evil as previously laid out. The free will defense
explains clearly how moral evils are done to people by others who
exercise their free will and do wrongly, but what about natural
evils? There are some evils in this world which are not
done by man but are out of his control and therefore must be
authored by God. How could man be the author of an
earthquake or a tornado? But if these evils are done to man
by God, how is it that a perfectly good God could do these
things? The only response to this that would allow for the
existence of a totally good God is if these occurrences are not
evil. The answer may be explained by the fact that all
humans do not have the same idea of what is evil and what is not.
If a city is destroyed by fire and brimstone, this would be
considered by the inhabitants of that city to be an evil
committed against them. However, if the people of this city
had been taking large numbers of people from the neighboring
cities and shipping them east to their crematoria, the people
from those cities might consider the destruction of that city to
be a good thing. In this case, the destruction of the city
would be justice, which would also be one of the gifts
given by an all-good God. Justice is good and not evil, so
in this case if one is to believe that there exists such a God as
has been referred to, then one must accept that all natural evils
must really be justice which is caused by evils done by those who
have made poor choices with their free will.
The justice defense
for the idea of free will runs into a snag because it would seem
that if God is completely just then he must administer justice
with complete and total fairness. But, as any one who lives
on earth will tell you, justice is not always served. So
how can God be totally just if suffering is not distributed
equally, or better proportionately to the evil done by the
sufferers? One must assume the existence of an afterlife,
or some continued existence after this life in which every one
shall receive his due which would put the argument on shaky
grounds. And even if one ignores the fact that
suffering is not endured by all equally, how can a perfect God
not intervene and stop suffering and still be perfect? It
would seem that if a man were to see a boy beating a dog and
would have no problems in stopping the boy, how could he be
perfectly good and not stop the beating? Watching evil
being done and not stopping when it is completely in your power
to do so would be wrong. If God failed to intervene he
would not appear to be all good, but if he did not because it is
not within his powers then he would not be all powerful.
So how may a
rational human believe in the existence of such a God?
It would seem that since Epicurus’ argument cannot be
countered, it must be true. The only answer that can
counter this is that man, unlike God, does not know everything
and his ability to reason is flawed and therefore cannot see
reality in its true light, but this is not an argument, and it
just attempts to circumvent the problem without dealing with it.
The belief in God, unless an adequate defense for his existence
can be found, will remain a matter of faith and not reason.