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On
Frederick Barbarossa and the Italian Coalition
Ryan Renfro
June 14th, 1999
History 115p
University of California Santa Barbara
Laura Wertheimer
According to the
Kyffhäuser legend, the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I lies
sleeping within a mountain, awaiting the time when Germany needs
him again. Originally ascribed to his grandson, Frederick
II, this legend was transferred during the Reformation to the
emperor the Italians called Barbarossa or “red beard.”[1] It comes as no
surprise that such a switch would occur; Barbarossa’s
Italian campaigns and death on crusade have captured the fancy of
generations of Europeans to come, inspiring operas and plays.
It is only natural that such a figure would have become a symbol
of not only anti-papal sentiment during the Reformation, but of
German unity during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries as well.
The real
Barbarossa, however, saw himself as neither of these. Frederick
I was a medieval king, the inheritor of a tradition going back
through Charlemagne to the emperors of ancient Rome. Frederick’s
six campaigns in Italy were not a conflict between Church and
State nor Germany and Italy, but were instead the actions of a
feudal king trying to establish greater control over his domain.
Frederick at first pursued a policy of reestablishing such rights
in northern Italy as had been held by his predecessors as late as
the eleventh century, leading to a coalition of sorts between the
Lombards, the papacy, and the Sicilians allied against Frederick.
Defeated by the Lombards at Legnano in 1167, Frederick proceeded
with a more practical, compromising, and successful Italian
policy thereafter. The transformation in both Italian
policy as well as political climate which occurred following
Legnano make it the key point in understanding Frederick’s
reign. The battle of Legnano and the Treaties of Anagni and
Venice which followed it represent the turning point in
Frederick’s Italienpolitik not only because of this
shift in Frederick’s political approach to the area, but
also because it was at this time that Frederick was successful at
breaking up the tripartite coalition against him.
Upon his ascension
to the throne in 1152, Frederick had direct control over only the
familial lands which he himself possessed beforehand, mainly in
Swabia. Elected by the royal princes, a body consisting of
both lay and ecclesiastical lords from throughout the empire,
Frederick was the compromise candidate, related to both the Welfs
and the Hohenstaufens. The Welfs of the low countries the
Hohenstaufens of the southern regions were the two most powerful
families in Germany at that time, each possessing large estates
and a considerable portion of the imperial electorate. This
created an environment in which a candidate related to both
families such as Frederick was the only practical means of
placing a strong monarch upon the throne, since each family would
otherwise oppose the other’s candidate. To maintain
his support, however, Frederick would have to prove himself an
acceptable ruler to those who had elected him. In his first
years Frederick moved to secure his election by placating his
relatives, especially those on the Welf side since he was a
Hohenstaufen.[2] To his uncle Welf
VI he granted considerable lands in northern Italy, including the
Matildine lands and the margraviate of Tuscany, binding him to
most any action taken by Frederick in that region. Once the
lands were his, Welf VI would want the greatest rights and
authority over the area he could acquire. He would get this
through supporting Frederick in northern Italy, since Frederick
would help him assert authority in these regions because the more
Welf could exploit them, the more Frederick, Welf’s feudal
lord, would receive in turn. To Henry the Lion, duke of
Saxony, he granted the duchy of Bavaria. The Babenburger
Henry II Jasomirgott, the previous duke of Bavaria, was given the
eastern part of that duchy along with the new imperial duchy of
Austria. Not only did these new grants secure
Frederick’s election as emperor, but they brought the
recipients to the imperial policy. These men would give
crucial support to Frederick to press for his rights elsewhere.
As illustrated by the example of Welf VI, it is not premature at
this point to assert that Frederick was already preparing for
action in Italy.
The Italian situation was much different when Frederick took the
throne in 1152 than it had been a half-century earlier. Frederick
was the first Emperor reared after the Concordat of Worms which
had settled the Investiture controversy, a tremendous cause of
strife between the empire and the papacy. The Investiture
contest had, along with the quarter century of political strife
under Emperors Lothar and Conrad III, however, created a power
vacuum in northern Italy in which the growing city-states seized
many of the imperial regalian rights.[3] Jones summarizes the situation by
stating that the monarchy “reigned but no longer
ruled.”[4] Although the
city-states acknowledged some form of imperial overlordship, the
emperor’s influence was by and large merely nominal or de
jure. Wishing to strengthen his rule in Italy,
Frederick had high hopes of reestablishing de facto
influence over the city-states as well.
Frederick first sought a strong alliance with the papacy as
illustrated by the Treaty of Constance on March 23rd,
1153. When he met the papal legates at Constance, Frederick
agreed not only to defend the honor papatus, but also to
make no peace with the Normans in Sicily or the Romans, i.e. the
people of Rome, without consent from the pope. In return,
Pope Anastasius agreed to Frederick’s coronation and to
extend the honor imperii, or the rights and territorial
extent of the empire.[5] They also agreed
not to cede any land to the Byzantine Emperor Manuel I, who was
looking to increase his Italian holdings. The Treaty of
Constance gives a clear picture of pope and emperor, united
against the anti-papal citizens of Rome and the two dominant
powers of southern Italy; it is evidence of what must have been
thought to be a auspicious promise of cooperation, one soon bound
to collapse.
Frederick began his first Italian expedition in 1154, two years
after his ascension to the throne. He led a small force,
including perhaps as many as 1,800 knights under his most
powerful vassal, Duke Henry the Lion of Saxony, into Italy.[6] By the time he
arrived, Hadrian IV[7] had succeeded Anastasius
to the pontificate. Hadrian, the only English pope, agreed
in 1155 at Sutri to honor the Treaty of Constance. Upon
Frederick’s arrival in Rome to be crowned emperor by
Hadrian, the Romans offered him 5,000 pounds of gold, likely a
gross exaggeration, to crown him themselves.[8] Barbarossa, however, declined their
bribe and his coronation by Hadrian was held on June 18th
as Duke Henry the Lion suppressed an uprising by the Roman
populist leader Arnold of Brescia. Brescia was burned and
his ashes disposed of in the Tiber so as not to allow his relics
to fall into the hands of his followers. Hadrian appeared
willing to continue the papal-imperial relations as agreed upon
under Anastasius. Thus as late as 1155, imperial and papal
policies complemented each other, working to further one
another’s cause. Hadrian received immediate protection
against the Romans and the promise of action against the Normans
to the South, while Frederick received his crown and papal
support for his coming actions in Lombardy.
The cooperation of the Treaty of Constance was short-lived,
however, breaking down in 1156. The original plan was for
Frederick to fight William I of Sicily with the help of Manuel I
of Byzantium and the blessings of Pope Hadrian.[9] Problems in Germany, however, required
the emperor’s return, leaving Hadrian to deal with William
without imperial support. William besieged the pope at
Benevento in May, 1156, forcing him to offer peace. In the
subsequent arrangement in June, William recognized papal
overlordship and agreed to make payments to the papal curia in
exchange for far-reaching powers over the church in Sicily.[10] This linked the
papacy economically as well as feudally with the kingdom of
Sicily, a link which threatened any further action by the emperor
in the southern half of the peninsula. The compact at
Benevento drew Hadrian away from the imperial camp and to that of
William of Sicily, laying the foundations of what would soon
become an alliance of the Italian powers against the emperor.
Frederick’s inability to remain in Italy should therefore be
viewed as indirectly causing the first link in what would become
the coalition against him.
It seems fitting at this point to discuss some of the scholarship
on Frederick’s Italienpolitik, since for Peter Munz
this is the beginning of Barbarossa’s first great plan.
With strong power blocks granted to Frederick’s mightiest
vassals in the north and the east, Frederick had naturally turned
to the other parts of the empire. Munz claims that in and
after 1156 Frederick pursued what he terms as the “Great
Design,” a policy in which Frederick attempted to
consolidate his power within the neighboring regions of Swabia,
Burgundy, and Lombardy. What Frederick was attempting to
accomplish was nothing more than what the kings of France or even
his own vassals such as Henry the Lion were doing during this
time period- trying to establish direct control of an expanding,
contiguous group of regions in his domain without the burden of
having multiple lesser lords in that region. Frederick
already had a strong foothold in Swabia, possessing many Staufen
and Salian lands in the region.[11] He gained “suzerain rights
pertaining to the empire” [12] as well as a great deal of
direct control over Burgundy with his marriage to Beatrix,
daughter of Count Rainald of Burgundy in June, 1164.[13] With these two
regions largely under imperial control, Munz argues that
Frederick naturally turned toward Lombardy to regain the imperial
rights lost in that region.
Horst Fuhrmann sees the situation differently. He views the
Holy Roman Empire as consisting at this time of three kingdoms:
Germany, Burgundy, and Italy, the latter requiring constant
renewal of imperial authority.[14] Although he is correct in that Italy
did require constant imperial attention if control was to be
maintained, all regions required such imperial care to some
extent. Frederick was forced to return to Germany on
numerous occasions to deal with matters there, inconveniences
which often translated to setbacks in Italy. Although it is
important to keep in mind that the empire was comprised of a
number of diverse regions, the unity of the empire should also be
emphasized. Haverkamp, perhaps the most respected
contemporary scholar in this field, would tend to agree more with
Munz. He offers the thesis that “Barbarossa did not
pursue his Italienpolitik in order to advance his
interests in Germany, but that his Italian adventures possessed a
momentum of their own, representing a universal Reichspolitik.”[15] Thus any politics
or policies in Italy can only be understood within the context of
the whole empire.[16] This
is likely the case, since Frederick saw himself as emperor of the
entire empire and not just the overlord of a number of different
countries.[17] Of
all scholars, Haverkamp deals the best with the regional nature
of imperial politics while still emphasizing the overall imperial
unity and does so without anachronistic ideas of nationalism.
Peter Munz cites the appointment of Rainald of Dassel as imperial
advisor in 1156 as evidence of Frederick’s shift in policy.
Although Munz sees his appointment as a step by Frederick in
implementing the “Great Design,” Rainald to a large
extent came to dominate imperial policy during his lifetime.[18] As acutely
anti-papal as he was pro-imperial, Rainald proved to be a
polarizing figure in the emerging conflict between the imperial
and papal curiae. So great was his influence over imperial
politics that a contemporary referred to him as “the
beginning, middle, and end of the emperor’s honor.”[19] Meanwhile, the
papal curia had come to be dominated by the papal chancellor,
Cardinal Roland Bandinelli. A staunch reformist, Roland was
rigidly anti-imperial and used both his position as a papal
legate as well as his influence over Hadrian to oppose the empire
and Rainald.
There is perhaps no better demonstration of the breakdown in
papal-imperial relations than the events at Besançon in 1157.
Cardinal Roland met with Frederick to deliver a letter from the
pope in which he offered to bestow further beneficia upon
the emperor. The Latin term beneficia was ambiguous,
meaning either “favors” or “fiefs.”[20] The former
would be favorable to the emperor, however the latter would imply
that the emperor held the empire as a fief from the pope. The
latter, given by Rainald at Besançon, was an outrage to the
emperor, who claimed to hold the crown from God and the German
electorate, not as a fief from the pope. Haverkamp writes
that Rainald “knowingly” translated the term as if to
incite the emperor.[21] The
responsibility was not all Rainald’s: as Schimmelpfennig
points out, the ambiguity of the term beneficium could be
used as a tool by Hadrian and Roland to test the Toleranzgrenze,
or tolerance limit, of the emperor.[22] At any rate, a controversy ensued in
which Cardinal Roland declared, “From whom then has the
emperor the empire except from the Pope?”[23] The imperial court was outraged, and
the papal legates had to be quickly escorted under armed guard
away from the scene. As illustrated by the Besançon
incident, relations between the emperor and the papacy were
quickly deteriorating. The cause of this deterioration,
however, was not solely Frederick’s actions. It was
also the result of Frederick’s fanatically anti-papal
advisor Rainald and his interaction with an extremely
antagonistic Cardinal Rainald.
Relations with the papacy declining, Frederick departed in June
of 1158 on his second Italian campaign to press his rights in
Lombardy. Fuhrmann believes that while in Lombardy,
Frederick learned about the rights of emperors in antiquity from
the university in Bologna.[24] Whether
or not this is the case, Frederick did press for the
reinstatement of old rights in Lombardy at this time. After
the rebellious Milanese had capitulated and swore an oath of
allegiance to Frederick, he met with representatives from the
city-states at the Diet of Roncaglia in November, 1158. It
is here that Frederick defined his regalia, or imperial
rights in Lombardy, including the “right to nominate city
counsels, the right to build roads and take tolls, [and the]
right to coin money.”[25] The
Roncaglia decrees are not vague statements of overlordship but of
the “definite and concrete rights of rulership.”[26] These decrees
were approved by the Lombards in 1158, but by 1162 they would
come to despise them.[27] It
is little wonder they would, since as Munz states the Roncaglia
decrees, if ever completely implemented, would make Frederick the
most autocratic leader in Europe in his day.[28] The Roncaglia decrees became a rallying
point for anti-imperial sentiment in Lombardy, since they were
the reinstatement of imperial rights which the city-states had
grown accustomed to holding in the last half century. Furthermore,
the emperor and his supporters at this time “proceeded
ruthlessly against the territorial and political claims of the
papacy in northern and central Italy,”[29] earning the emperor the embitterment of the
pope.[30] Not
merely the Roncaglia decrees but the whole of Frederick’s
second Italian campaign further alienated the Lombards and the
papacy from imperial policies, placing them together in
opposition to the emperor. Thus one sees Frederick’s
pursuit of the “Great Design” as having led to
anti-imperial sentiment in Lombardy, a key factor in its coming
unification.
Pope Hadrian IV died 1159 and in subsequent elections the College of Cardinals was split between Cardinal Roland Bandinelli and Octavian of Monticelli. Roland had already proven himself strongly anti-imperial; thus Otto of Wittelsbach, Frederick’s man present, supported Octavian wholeheartedly.[31] In the terrible mess which ensued, Octavian was declared Pope Victor IX by some of the cardinals while Roland was named Alexander III by the remaining cardinals. Frederick held a council at Pavia in January, 1160 to settle the disputed election. Alexander and his supporters failed to show, however, believing the council would be biased against them. Frederick therefore had no choice but to confirm Victor. The council then excommunicated Alexander, who excommunicated Victor, Frederick, and Frederick’s advisors in turn. Cooperation between emperor and pope would be an impossibility during the eighteen-year schism which followed, making Alexander a ready ally for anyone opposed to the emperor.
The foundations of an Italy united against Barbarossa were laid
during the early years of the “Great Design.” Munz
claims there existed a secret conspiracy against Frederick
Barbarossa by Hadrian, William I of Sicily and Milan as early as
1159 in which money was forwarded to the latter in return for
rebellion.[32] It
is likely that such a transfer of funds could have occurred,
however conspiracy may not be an entirely correct term since, as
Munz points out, Frederick’s followers suspected the secret
transfer of funds everywhere and he most likely would have
suspected Milan’s papal and Sicilian benefactors.[33] As mentioned
above, William I and the pope had already come to an agreement at
Benevento in which their interests came to lie with the relative
strength and prosperity of the other. The imposition of the
Roncaglia decrees brought Lombard cities such as Milan to support
Alexander as well. Frederick destroyed Milan in 1162,
bringing Lombardy further under his control while causing support
for Alexander to grow in that region. Munz writes that,
“Without the schism, the destruction of Milan would have
been no more than a harsh primitive measure. With the
schism, it came to be seen as the act of a brutal tyrant.”[34] Western
Christendom was divided into two camps: Frederick and his
“antipope” on one side and Alexander, backed by the
remaining monarchs of Western Europe, on the other. Since
Frederick was an excommunicated man, supporting the wrong pope in
the view of many outside the Empire, any brutal measures taken by
Frederick were judged more harshly than they would have been
otherwise. Furthermore, support for Alexander in the split
between himself and Frederick made the movement of the Lombard
city-states to the papal camp considerably easier. Alexander
III left Italy for France in 1162, partially due to unstable
conditions in Italy but also to pursue support there. Both
Louis VII of France and Henry II of England had agreed to support
Alexander at a synod in Toulouse in 1160, negotiations with
Frederick over recognition of the imperial pope having failed at
that time.[35] The
opposition against Frederick’s pope, like that to his
policy, was growing.
Frederick’s next obstacle was the formation of the League of
Verona in 1163. A coalition between Venice, Vicenza, Padua,
and Verona, the League of Verona was formed in opposition to
Frederick’s actions in Lombardy. The Patriarch of
Grado, Henry Dandolo, used the monetary resources of Venice to
establish the league with organizational and monetary aid from
Manuel I of Byzantium.[36] The
first league of its kind created to oppose the emperor instead of
rival cities or groups of cities, the League of Verona set
precedence for the Lombard League, formed four years later.
What interest would Manuel of Byzantium of had in such a League
though? Desperate for allies, Alexander and his allies had
turned for help toward the Byzantine emperor. When William
I of Sicily died in 1166, they even went so far as to propose a
married between William II and one of Manuel’s daughters, to
which Manuel requested a reunification of the churches in which
the Pope would crown him Roman emperor.[37] Henderson discusses Manuel’s
“gigantic scheme” as well, which he names as the cause
of Manuel’s assuming the role of “protector of the
papacy.”[38] Although
these radical proposals were dropped, they do show that by the
1160s the Byzantine emperor had shown himself more willing to
cooperate with Frederick’s Italian opponents than with the
western emperor and therefore can be counted as at least a
supporter of the Italian coalition against Frederick.
As early as 1161, Frederick could see the magnitude of the
coalition against him. Burchard, one of his leading
diplomats, wrote in 1161 that “the whole of Christendom,
misled by Roland, was preparing a general coalition against
Frederick.”[39] On
the lookout for potential allies, Frederick found one in Henry II
of England. Henry came into conflict with Alexander III
when he issued his Constitutions of Clarendon in 1164, a rift
which widened after the martyrdom of St. Thomas Becket. As
a result of this friction between Henry and Alexander, Frederick
persuaded Henry at the Würzburg diet in 1165 to swear with him
never to recognize Alexander as pope. In exchange for this
oath, Frederick agreed to marry his son, Frederick, to Henry of
England’s daughter Eleanor.[40] Henry of England’s other daughter,
Matilda, was betrothed to Duke Henry the Lion of Saxony. When
the quote from Burchard is juxtaposed with Frederick’s
diplomacy with Henry II of England, they clearly show that
Frederick was aware of the situation developing and are evidence
of his attempt to build support in opposition to the Italian
alliance.
In the fall of 1166 Frederick set out on his fourth Italian
expedition with some 10,000 knights and Brabanzoni, or
mercenaries from Brabant.[41] King
William I of Sicily died the same year, leaving his kingdom to a
young William II who had little control of his new kingdom.
Marching toward Rome, Frederick split his army into two groups:
one, led by the emperor, was to take the coastal route along the
Adriatic while the other, under Rainald, went through Tuscany
toward Rome.[42] Upon
their arrival at Rome, they laid siege to the Romans, devastating
the countryside for a couple months. The Romans found this
intolerable and due to Rainald’s insistence that Alexander
be handed over or no peace would be agreed upon, they eventually
besieged Alexander in a fortress near the Colosseum.[43] This double
siege did not last long, however, and by the time of the
emperor’s arrival Alexander had managed to slip away to
safety.[44] Although
Frederick’s top objective, the capture of Alexander, had
failed,[45]
Frederick was able to enthrone Paschal III, imperial pope since
1163, in St. Peter’s.[46] Paschal
then crowned Beatrix empress several days later. The
Romans, once again showing their willingness to side with the
emperor against the pope, made an alliance with Frederick which
would last until 1177.[47] To
reiterate, the Romans were not trilled by such an alliance, but a
far-off emperor was a weaker overlord and thus a better ally than
a constantly present pope. Although Alexander had not been
obtained, with Paschal on the throne of St. Peter and the Romans
supporting Frederick, the expedition still appeared to be a
success in early August.
With Rome firmly under his control, Frederick was poised to
possibly invade the weakened Sicilian kingdom under William II.
While this would have by no means been out of the range of
actions Frederick could have pursued at this instant, it seems a
more productive choice would have been the capture of Alexander. Regardless
of which Frederick would have attempted, he did not get the
chance. A plague, commonly held to be malaria, swept
through his army in the Italian heat, decimating his army and
killing many of his most ardent followers. Frederick
himself fell ill and Rainald of Dassal perished. Frederick
then returned to Germany, at one point humiliatingly dressed as a
servant to escape through Burgundy.[48] The “Catastrophe before Rome in
1167,” as it came to be known, was not only the major
turning point for Frederick’s fourth Italian campaign, but a
main turning point for his entire reign as well.[49] Although Frederick was freed of
Rainald’s “uncompromising asserting of principle,”[50] i.e. his anti-papal,
pro-imperial principle, the loss of Rainald and of many other
supporters significantly weakened Frederick’s ability to
enforce his claims in Lombardy.
News of the outbreak which Alexander III referred to as
“divine judgement”[51] spread quickly throughout Lombardy. Taking
advantage of the emperor’s weakness, the League of Verona
expanded in late 1167 to form the Lombard League, picking up even
the formerly-pro-imperial Crimea and Lodi.[52] The purpose of this new League was
twofold. It sought to oppose all imperial demands for
rights except those held by the emperors Henry IV and Conrad III,
i.e. the Lombards were intent upon preserving the rights they had
acquired during the first half of the Twelfth Century. To
maintain unity, it also sought to end internal rivalries.[53] Thus the Lombard
League united against Frederick because he attempted to regain
the regalia secured by the Lombards at the emperor’s
expense. They were not pushing for new rights or freedom
from imperial overlordship but merely the continuation of the
relationship between Lombard cities and the emperors as it had
developed in the early part of the twelfth century.
Alexander quickly took advantage of the blossoming unity in
Lombardy, sending papal legates to preside in league assemblies.
In 1167 he issued a bull declaring that the league should
“defend the peace and liberty of the church of God as well
as the peace and liberty of the Lombards.”[54] The Lombards welcomed Alexander’s
support, naming the fortress city being constructed on the river
Tanaro, built solely in opposition to the emperor, Alessandria.[55] The alliance
between Pope Alexander III, supported financially by the king of
Sicily and the Lombards (themselves supported by this time in
part by the distant emperor of Byzantium) was the ultimate
manifestation of the Italian coalition against Frederick. It
was the climax of the unifying forces at work since the Treaty of
Benevento and the Roncaglia decrees. It was what Frederick
had to somehow overcome or disassemble in order to have any
success whatsoever in the Italian theatre.
By 1174 Frederick was ready to enter Italy again. He
departed on his fifth Italian expedition with around 8,000
soldiers, besieging Alessandria for six months.[56] Failing to capture it, Frederick met
the Lombard army at Montebello. Instead of fighting,
Frederick offered peace and negotiations were held between him
and Cremona. The league rejected the terms offered by
Barbarossa, in part because of Milan’s opposition to the
negotiations worked out by the more pro-imperial Cremonese[57]. Frederick had
demanded the destruction of Alessandria, which Milan and its
allies rejected, themselves demanding the inclusion of Alexander
III in any agreements reached with Frederick. The Lombards
and Alexander were not unwilling to come to terms with Frederick,
but they did refuse any peace which excluded the other.
Negotiations between Frederick and the Lombards having failed,
Frederick met the Lombard forces outside Legnano on May 29th,
1176. Most historians fail to discuss the battle, calling
it a “defeat” and “humiliation” and leaving
it at that. Munz, however, describes it in some detail.
He points out that there was no clear decision for hours. It
was not until Frederick was struck from his horse and lost in the
thick of battle that the imperial lines began to crumble and the
Lombards were able to win the day. If correct, this meant
that Legnano was not a decisive military defeat, and that
Frederick could have resumed hostilities once he rejoined his
army four days later.[58] This
of course has great implications on the treaty that followed,
indicating that Frederick was not forced into coming to terms by
military defeat but instead chose to make peace for other
reasons. Munz’s discussion therefore supports both his
theory that a chance in policy occurred something around Legnano
as well as the argument proposed in this paper that this was
indeed the turning point for his Italianpolitik.
In the peace negotiations at Anagni, the Pope and the Lombards
still appeared to be partners.[59] Munz states that while negotiations
were in progress with the Lombards, Frederick sent Christian von
Mainz and others to Alexander, [60] who still refused any peace
which did not include the Lombards.[61] The Treaty was not signed until November,
providing an armistice between Barbarossa and the Lombards and
the transfer of the Matildine lands from the emperor to Alexander
III. While most sources have Barbarossa initiating the
peace settlement, Joachim Ehlers clearly writes that Alexander
broke rank with the Lombards at this time in his negotiations
with Frederick.[62] Although
he was undoubtedly just as eager to make peace as Frederick, such
a break in ranks would have been extremely uncharacteristic of
Alexander and he most likely waited until a peace was reached
that included the Lombards. Whether or not the coalition
had begun to come apart at this time, the Battle of Legnano and
the peace negotiations which followed were the cause of the
anti-imperial Italian coalition’s collapse following the
battle.
Negotiations between Frederick, the Lombards, and the Sicilians
resumed the next year in 1177. In the Treaty of Venice,
signed on July 24th, Frederick agreed to a six-year
peace with the Lombards and to fifteen years of peace with
William II of Sicily.[63] Furthermore,
Frederick recognized Alexander III as pope and promised him the
Matildine lands in fifteen years, kissing the pope’s feet
and sending him back to Rome under the escort of Christian von
Mainz. Not only had Frederick managed to preserve control
over the Matildine lands for an additional fifteen years, but the
anti-imperial Italian coalition was left without a basis. The
schism had ended, giving neither Alexander nor the Lombards any
specific purposes to oppose Frederick in Italy. As a
result, the coalition collapsed and Frederick was freed from
constant warfare to pursue a more practical policy in Italy.
Now that Frederick was no longer at war with the Lombards and
Alexander, he at once turned to exploiting the instability of
their alliance. He first did this by making a pact with his
long-time adversary, Milan, against his former supporter,
Cremona. This unexpected switch in alliance by Frederick
was meant to exploit rivalries and undermine the unity of the
Lombard League. Frederick’s abandonment of enforcing
Roncaglia decrees following the battle of Legnano undermined the
very foundations of the Lombard League since it had been
primarily formed to oppose his restoration of imperial rights.[64] Frederick was
therefore in a much better position because he could deal with
Lombard cities on an individual basis rather than with a united
front against him.
The actions of Frederick following Legnano display a clear switch
in direction concerning his policies, not only in Italy but
throughout the empire as a whole. Munz dubs the period from
1176 until the end of Barbarossa’s rule as the time of his
third plan in which he would ride “the wave of
feudalism.”[65] During
this period Frederick would work to strengthen his feudal
overlordship in Italy, Germany, Burgundy, and especially in the
Matildine lands, still in the emperor’s possession. Munz’s
synthesis of this period is useful because it acknowledges that
Frederick did pursue a more practical policy following the battle
of Legnano in that he was no longer pushing for rights he was
unlikely to obtain. Munz’s argument, however, fails to
recognize the ambiguity of the term feudalism.[66] It is commonly held that feudalism
applies not to a single set form of relations, but is a general
term applied to a large variety of relationships. Although
many of the rights Frederick had pushed for under the Roncaglia
decrees were seen as originating from the Roman emperors, they
were held as late as the end of the eleventh century. Since
these rights had been held by prior emperors under the system
termed feudalism, one should be hesitant to suggest or point the
reader to the conclusion that Frederick’s “Great
Design” was anything but feudal. The Italian states
had sworn an oath to Frederick, as is common in feudal relations,
to uphold the Roncaglia decrees. The change in
Frederick’s policy after Legnano should therefore not be
viewed as one from absolutism or non-feudalism to feudalism, but
from upholding rights that cannot practically be upheld to those
which may be. What Munz is really getting at by
Frederick’s riding “the wave of Feudalism” is that
Frederick recognized the changes in the political atmosphere of
his dynamic realm and altered his policy to take advantages of
those developments.
One region over which Frederick could establish greater control
with relatively little resistance was the Matildine lands.[67] The Matildine
lands were sold to Frederick by his uncle, Welf VI, along with
his other rights in Italy. Welf had been granted the
Margraviate of Tuscany, the Matildine lands, and two other
smaller duchies in Italy by Barbarossa in the early years of his
reign in order to bind Welf to his Italian policy.[68] Welf, however,
lost interest in Italy and when cooperation with Frederick broke
down in the early 1170s, the lands were transferred to Frederick,
who could make better use of them.[69] Although the Matildine lands were in
theory supposed to be given to the papacy, Frederick had secured
them for at least fifteen years in the Treaty of Venice and he
therefore set about strengthening his rule in them. In 1183
Frederick offered Pope Lucius III, who had succeeded Alexander
III to the papacy in 1181, a tenth of his Italian income for the
Matildine lands. This would have been a wonderful exchange
for Frederick, since not only would he have permanent authority
over this disputed region but because more importantly it would
have brought the pope to support his claims in Lombardy. Under
these circumstances the greater the rights Frederick had in
Italy, the greater the pope’s income would be. The
pope would therefore be more willing to side with Frederick
against the Lombards. Although Lucius declined the
emperor’s offer, Frederick’s negotiations in this
matter nevertheless serve to illustrate his motives. This
attempt to set former Italian allies against one another is
characteristic of Barbarossa’s post-Legnano politics.
Since the Peace of Venice offered a mere six-year armistice, a
final peace treaty between the emperor and the Lombards was
needed. This came in the form of the Peace of Constance in
June of 1183. Frederick agreed to renounce the execution of
the Roncaglia decrees and to allow the cities constitutional
independence within their walls.[70] The Lombards cities agreed to pay the
emperor 15,000 Marks of silver up front, along with annual
payments of 2,000 Marks. With this they swore an oath of
loyalty to the emperor and promised to provide fodrum, or
lodging for soldiers, as well. The Lombards also pledged to
submit their fortress city of Alessandria, formed in opposition
to imperial rule. Named originally for his chief opponent,
Alessandria was renamed Caesarea in honor of the emperor, no
insignificant detail since the main rallying point for
anti-imperial resistance became a city bearing the emperor’s
name. This was in fact symbolic of the shift from an Italy
united against Barbarossa to one which did not require his
continual attention, allowing him to spend more time dealing with
other regions in his domain.
Despite the seemingly clear nature of the Peace of Constance,
scholars are by no means in agreement upon its implications or
its meaning. Fuhrmann writes that Frederick managed to
preserve “most of his governmental powers” in Italy.[71] Although he did
maintain the rights held by the emperor when he was elected, he
nevertheless did relinquish all of those powers demanded at
Roncaglia. Frederick can therefore only be said to have
preserved those governmental powers which he held indisputably
before Legnano. Munz writes of Frederick’s political
situation at and after Constance that:
“the recognition of Frederick’s imperial lordship, without the implementation of any rights which follow from such a lordship, equals a feudal relationship; or, better, equals a relationship which was the Italian equivalent of the German feudalism of the third plan.”[72]
The aforementioned problem with Munz’s discussion of feudalism aside, this passage contains a number of other statements that deserve comment. First, the emperor did maintain minimal rights over the cities of Lombardy, only not as many as he desired or held by law before the Peace of Constance. Second, although Frederick’s position in Germany could be termed as a weak overlordship, he was certainly not lacking rights, nor did he abstain from implementing them in Germany during the period of the “third plan.”[73] Perhaps the best summary of Frederick’s position following the Peace of Constance would be that although Frederick abandoned hope of regaining the imperial rights lost at the beginning of the century, he did manage to preserve all remaining, undisputed imperial rights in Italy. The Treaty of Venice and the Peace of Constance portray Frederick as a pragmatic ruler who, by and after 1167, knew what he could and could not accomplish in Italy and who was willing to compromise when it benefited his cause. An obvious conclusion to be drawn from the analysis of the Treaty of Constance and Frederick’s actions following Legnano is that he abandoned, to a certain extent, the hope of becoming what he believed the emperor ideally was- an leader with such rights and powers as possessed by the Roman emperors and their Germanic successors. Instead of pursuing those rights said to be held by previous emperors, Frederick examined the actual political atmosphere of his time, pursuing a very practical policy within that context thereafter. Thus Frederick abandoned what rights he thought he should have, concentrating instead on the ones he could.
As Haverkamp correctly points out, one should not view
Frederick’s Italian policies without taking into account the
rest of the empire as well. After concluding the Treaty of
Venice, Frederick headed back to Germany in 1178. In so
doing, he traveled through Burgundy, where he had the Archbishop
of Arles crown him King of Burgundy.[74] Munz sees this as part of
Frederick’s “rid[ing] on the crest of the wave of
feudalism.”[75] Although
this may be correct in that in that Frederick was attempting to
establish himself firmly at the summit of the feudal pyramid, a
better interpretation might be that with the new peace in Italy,
Frederick turned towards other regions in an attempt to increase
his power there.[76] Such
as shift would have been only natural, since Frederick was forced
to abandon many of his designs for Italy. As previously
mentioned, Frederick had made large gains in Burgundy from his
marriage, while the Italian peace freed him to pursue his rights
further in that region. The Italian peace therefore proved
to be the turning point in Burgundy as well since the emperor
secured a more direct rule in that region.
Once he returned to Germany, Frederick began to pursue the same
policy of establishing a more direct rule there. The
greatest obstacle for Frederick’s implementation of greater
control in Germany was his mightiest vassal, Henry the Lion.
Henry had continually supported Frederick in Italy until 1176.
Frederick had asked Henry at Chiavenna for his assistance. Engagement
with the Lombards was imminent, and Frederick had dismissed a
large portion of his army. Henry, who was not obligated to
support Frederick, offered to do so only in exchange for imperial
Goslar and its surrounding silver mines, but Frederick declined.
Most scholars see this act as a form of blackmail on Henry’s
part or an outrage that he would decline to help his feudal
overlord, even though he had no such obligation to do so. Munz,
however, points out that of all the vassals who declined to
support Frederick at Chiavenna, Henry was only specifically
mentioned later.[77] If
this was the case, Frederick must have thought nothing of
Henry’s refusal at the time. It is unlikely, though, that
Frederick would have thought nothing of a vassal as powerful as
Henry’s failure to lend him troops. Whatever the case,
Frederick would certainly have held Henry at least
semi-responsible for the outcome at Legnano. Furthermore,
the peace with the three Italian powers made the Henry, duke of
Saxony and Bavaria, Frederick’s chief rival, since the
existence of what some have referred to as Henry’s
“state” was a force to be reckoned with in Germany.[78] As a territorial
expansionist, Henry earned the emnity of many of his surrounding
peers. Therefore, when Frederick returned to deal with
Henry, he had no problem finding allies against him. Thus,
when Henry and his enemies brought charges against each other at
Speier in November of 1178, Frederick could demand that they
appear in Worms in January to answer those charges.[79] Henry failed to
show first at Worms and then in Magdeburg the following summer.[80] In 1180, Henry
was tried by a number of his peers and deprived of Westphalia,
Bavaria, and Saxony. With the support of Henry the
Lion’s rivals, Frederick led an imperial army into Saxony in
1181, sentencing Henry to three years of exile. Although
Henry returned and regained most of his original power, Frederick
was the victor of the dispute. Much like the kings in
England and France, Frederick used his position as dispenser of
justice within his realm not only to increase the prestige of the
monarchy but as a tool to diminish the power of his strongest and
most threatening vassal. Clearly Frederick used very
practical means within the political system of his time to
dispossess Henry. This tactic, which ultimately
strengthened Barbarossa’s position in Germany, was only
possible after the change of Italian policy which occurred
following the battle of Legnano.
The greatest manifestation of the fundamental change which
occurred in the politics of Italy following Legnano, however, was
the betrothal of Frederick’s son Henry to Constance of
Sicily. The first marriage proposal joining the imperial
house with the royal house of Sicily occurred in 1173 when
Frederick offered the hand of his daughter, Beatrix, to King
William II.[81] His
motives were to break up what remained of the alliance between
Sicily, the pope and the Lombard League; thus he was consequently
turned down by William II. When further attempts were made
by Barbarossa to join the two houses, William resisted due to the
poor treatment of his brother-in-law, Henry the Lion.[82] Once relations
between Frederick and Henry the Lion had improved, however, a
union became a possibility once again. Fröhlich even
argues that William II proposed the marriage.[83] Such a proposal would not be
unthinkable since William and his wife remained childless. William’s
aunt Constance was unmarried and could provide an heir to the
kingdom assuming that William were to be incapable of producing
one. Fröhlich, however, does not go unchallenged in
suggesting that William made the proposal. Munz suggests
that Pope Lucius suggested it in an attempt to make peace.[84] Although this
would not have been beyond Lucius, who appears to have been more
concerned with being the Vicar of Christ and less with the
politics of his day, the marriage was more likely proposed by one
of the houses involved.
The agreement for the wedding of Constance of Sicily with Henry,
(who became Henry VI after Frederick’s death on crusade in
1190), was reached between Frederick, William II and Lucius at
the Conference of Verona. By approving such a union, Lucius
was acting in the interests of a peaceful Christendom and not
those of the papacy.[85] Milan,
which had up to the Battle of Legnano been Barbarossa’s
greatest opponent in Lombardy, offered to host the ceremony in
January of 1186 as a sign of imperial grace.[86] Despite the later opposition by the
more political-minded Urban III, who saw such a union as
dangerous to the papal position in Italy, Henry VI married
Constance, a marriage which would produce an heir to each kingdom
in the person of Frederick II. The great change in Italian
politics, however, did not occur when Henry VI took Sicily in
1194; instead, it was evident once the betrothal was reached.
Concerning the marriage, Fröhlich writes that:
“It brought about a fundamental change of the balance of power between the European realms. The alliances of the papacy with the Norman kingdom of Sicily, [and] the Lombard cities…against the [emperor] were terminated. It brought to an end the enmity of the Latin empire towards the Norman kingdom of Sicily which had lasted for more than a century.”
The
importance of this event cannot be overemphasized. Haverkamp
even suggests that Frederick “dropped all consideration for
the papacy” at this time.[87] Such a statement about any event in the
preceding decade would be unthinkable. The marriage stands
as proof that Frederick’s change in direction after Legnano
was successful at breaking down the tripartite coalition against
him.
Although he suffered humiliation at the Battle of Legnano, Frederick I was able to turn what appeared to be defeat into a political victory in the following peace agreements. By splitting the alliance against him, Frederick was willing and able to pursue a much more practical policy and was therefore able to secure for his son Henry VI a much greater political influence and a much stronger throne than the one he ascended to some forty years before. Jones writes that the Roncaglia decrees “did more to strengthen the communes rather than renovate the empire.”[88] This is correct in that Frederick’s pursuit of his regalian rights caused the Lombards to unite against him and thus his Lombard aims in the “Great Design” proved to be impractical. A change in policy was therefore needed. Fuhrmann states that it is through his ability to compromise that Frederick was able to overcome defeat.[89] Although Legnano appears to have been more of a setback than a decisive military defeat, Frederick used the peace negotiations following the battle to effectively change the entire political order of Italy to his advantage. Munz, who argues very well that a switch in policy occurred in 1176 and 1177, does not emphasize enough the importance of the Italian coalition’s dissolution. It is the key to understanding Frederick’s later successes against Henry the Lion and what is perhaps his greatest political triumph- the marriage of his son Henry to Constance of Sicily, a union which would eventually bring the Kingdom of Sicily into the empire.
[1]Horst Fuhrmann. Germany in the High Middle Ages, c. 1050-1200. trans. Timothy Reuter (New York, 1986) p. 135.
[2] Alfred Haverkamp,. Medieval Germany 1056-1273. trans. Helga Braun and Richard Mortimer (New York, 1992) p. 225.
[3] Regalian rights were the imperial right emperors had held over the cities of Lombardy until the beginning of the twelfth century. They shall be discussed further under the Roncaglia decrees.
[4] Philip Jones. The Italian City-State: From Commune to Signoria. (Oxford, 1997) p. 337.
[5] Fuhrmann, Germany in the High Middle Ages, p. 141.
[6] Fuhrmann, Germany in the High Middle Ages, p. 142.
[7] Also known as Adrian IV.
[8] Jürgen Petersohn points out that the Romans, i.e. the people of Rome, had reestablished the Senate in 1143, leading to what he describes as a Renaissance in “säkularen Romgedanken,” which roughly translates to a secular view of Rome. Wishing to revive the Roman Republic, this movement was hostile to both pope and emperor.
Jürgen Petersohn, “Friedrich Barbarossa und Rom,” in Friedrich Barbarossa: Handlungsspielräume und Wirkungsweisen des Staufischen Kaisers, hrsg. von Alfred Haverkamp, (Sigmarigen 1992), pp. 130-133. However, since the pope posed a much more immediate threat to such a movement, it appears reasonable that they should have been willing to ally themselves with the emperor against the pope. That was exactly what such a coronation would have done. The Romans wanted to state that the Roman Emperor was invested by the people of Rome instead of the Bishop of Rome. Frederick, however, realized that such nostalgic ideas of “secular” Roman greatness had vanished and had no relevance outside the city of Rome and therefore declined their offer.
[9] The scholarship is frankly unclear and often contradictory when discussing the role of the Byzantine Emperor in the first years of Frederick’s reign. The Encyclopædia Britannica has Frederick as having turned down the continuation of an alliance with Emperor Manuel I made with Conrad III against Roger II of Sicily in order to put pressure on the pope to make him sign the Treaty of Constance. Other scholars seem to agree that the alliance did not fail until July of 1156, probably the result of the pope’s peace with the Normans and Frederick’s inability to invade for the time being. That would mean that the alliance failed not because Frederick sacrificed it for an alliance with the pope, but because Frederick had failed to invade Sicily and the pope had already made peace with William II of Sicily. Although the date given for the failure of such an alliance offered in the second would seem to disprove the first, it is a possibility that Frederick merely delayed affirming the actual alliance. Whatever the case may be, both emperors would have fought together against a common foe in southern Italy at this time.
[10] Haverkamp. Medieval Germany, p. 229.
[11] The Staufen and Salian families where two of Germany’s most powerful families to which Frederick belonged.
[12] Suzerain rights are the rights one state holds over another which it controls politically.
[13] Peter Munz, Frederick Barbarossa: A Study in Medieval Politics, (London, 1969), p. 117.
[14] Fuhrmann, Germany in the High Middle Ages, p. 20-21.
[15] Charles R. Bowlus, Rev. of Friedrich Barbarossa: Handlungsspielräume und Wirkungsweisen des Staufischen Kaisers, hrsg. von Alfred Haverkamp, Speculum 69.4 (Oct. 1994), p. 1181.
[16] In his article, Peter Ganz writes that “we must guard against justifying our own rationalizing reconstructions of how and why rulers like Barbarossa acted by assuming that they had laid down and carried out an equally rational programme when in many cases we are dealing with the ad hoc decisions of a ruler surrounded by a fluctuating group of advisors.” Although Frederick’s actions often fall outside the general policies proposed by those such as Munz, overall trends in Barbarossa’s “policy” are observable and should therefore be accepted, but with caution. Peter Ganz, “Politics and Policy in the Age of Barbarossa.” Beiträge zur Geschichte der Deutschen Sprache und Literatur, 116.2 (1994), pp. 240-241.
[17] Nationalism as understood in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries did not yet exist at this time. Mental divisions between “Germany” and “Italy” were scarcely present during Frederick’s reign. It should, therefore, be emphasized that these terms should be used to refer to regions within a single empire and not national units.
[18] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 92.
[19] Ernest F Henderson, A History of Germany in the Middle Ages (New York, 1968), p. 253.
[20] Haverkamp, Medieval Germany, p. 229.
[21] Haverkamp, Medieval Germany, p. 229.
[22] “Weil auch an der römischen Kurie diese Interpretation von beneficium nicht unbekannt war, kann es sein, dab der englische Papst und sein Kanzler die Toleranzgrenze des Kaisers testen wollten.” Although this passage implies that the normal papal use of the term beneficium meant “favors,” it does state that the curia was well aware of the double meaning. Knowing the response that the “fief” translation would generate, they could have been expected to avoid such an ambiguous term unless they had not wanted to test or incite the emperor. Bernhard Schlimmelpfennig, Könige und Fürsten, Kaiser und Papst nach dem Wormser Konkordat, Enzyklopädie Deutscher Geschichte 37 (München, 1996), p. 34.
[23] Henderson, A History of Germany in the Middle), p. 261.
[24] Fuhrmann, Germany in the High Middle Ages, p. 143.
[25] Fuhrmann, Germany in the High Middle Ages, p. 147.
[26] Fuhrmann, Germany in the High Middle Ages, p. 157.
[27] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 166.
[28] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, pp. 199-120.
[29] Haverkamp, Medieval Germany, p. 229.
[30] Henderson, A History of Germany in the Middle), p. 262.
[31] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, pp. 205-206
[32] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 201.
[33] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 201.
[34] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 225.
[35] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 223.
[36] Fuhrmann, Germany in the High Middle Ages, p. 158.
[37] Fuhrmann, Germany in the High Middle Ages, p. 159.
[38] Henderson, A History of Germany in the Middle), p. 266.
[39] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 226.
[40] The union between Frederick and Eleanor never took place.
[41] Fuhrmann, Germany in the High Middle Ages, p. 159.
[42] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 249
[43] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 250.
[44] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 251
[45]Munz links the “Great Design” with the pursuit of Alexander, making his capture one of the prime objectives in Frederick’s fourth Italian expedition. Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 258.
[46] Upon Victor IX’s death, Rainald had Paschal III quickly elected before word reached the emperor. Rainald’s haste may be attributed to the possibility that Frederick might have chosen to come to terms with Alexander III. Thus Rainald’s fanaticism prevented any hope of ending the schism at that time. “Frederick I” in Encyclopedia Britannica, http://search.eb.com/bol/topic?eu=35893&sctn=3.
[47] Petersohn, “Friedrich Barbarossa und Rom,” p. 138.
[48] Fuhrmann, Germany in the High Middle Ages, p. 160.
[49] Fuhrmann, Germany in the High Middle Ages, p. 159.
[50] Fuhrmann, Germany in the High Middle Ages, p. 160.
[51] Fuhrmann, Germany in the High Middle Ages, p. 160.
[52] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 280.
[53] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 284.
[54] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 284.
[55] Some sources have the name as “Alexandria.”
[56] Fuhrmann, Germany in the High Middle Ages, p. 160.
[57] Fuhrmann, Germany in the High Middle Ages, p. 160.
[58] For Munz’s discussion of the Battle of Legnano, see Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, pp. 310-312.
[59] Fuhrmann, Germany in the High Middle Ages, p. 161.
[60] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, pp. 312-313.
[61] This was not Frederick’s first attempt at reconciliation with Alexander, merely the first direct attempt. Frederick had previously sent an abbot from both Cîteaux and Clairvaux to negotiate with Alexander about having Frederick’s son Henry recognize Alexander, since Frederick was bound by his oath at Würzburg not to do so. These negotiations, however, proved ultimately unsuccessful.
[62] “Zunächst schied Papst Alexander III. aus der Einheitsfront der Kaisergegner aus und stimmte im November 1176 in Anagni einer Neuregelung der Beziehungen zwischen Reich und Kirche zu.” Joachim Ehlers, ”Heinrich der Löwe und der sächsische Episkopat,“ in Friedrich Barbarossa: Handlungsspielräume und Wirkungsweisen des Staufischen Kaisers, hrsg. von Alfred Haverkamp, (Sigmarigen 1992), p. 450.
[63] Fuhrmann, Germany in the High Middle Ages, p. 161.
[64] Although Frederick did not formally renounce the Roncaglia decrees until the Peace of Constance in 1183, he attempted in no way to enforce them following Legnano.
[65] Munz writes that there were a number of Feudal developments around the time Frederick’s reign, and that in his third plan Frederick set about to take advantages of those changes. Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 316.
[66] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, pp. 316-325.
[67] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 326.
[68] Haverkamp, Medieval Germany, p. 226.
[69] Haverkamp, Medieval Germany, p. 226.
[70] Constitutional independence in this sense refers not to a physical constitution as is the case in the United States, but instead to an agreement between the emperor and the city-states in which they were to have authority within their city walls. This authority was exercised by whatever form of city council each city possessed.
[71] Fuhrmann, Germany in the High Middle Ages, p. 174.
[72] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 362.
[73] Holy Roman Emperors in this period had comparatively little control over Germany, or the majority of their realm for that matter. Although they did of course control imperial justice and receive military help from their vassals, they lacked the highly trained and educated ministerials, possessed by the Kings of England for example, to have any sort of effective government.
[74] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 333.
[75] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 316.
[76] For a discussion of the feudal order or pyramid in Frederick’s reign, see Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 336.
[77] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 307.
[78] Henry the Lion’s holdings are sometimes referred to as a state due to their immense size, relative power within the empire, and the authority which Henry possessed within them. Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 337.
[79] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 348.
[80] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 349.
[81] Walter Fröhlich, “The Marriage of Henry VI and Constance of Sicily: Prelude and Consequences,” in Anglo-Norman Studies XV, ed. Marjorie Chibnall (Woodbridge, UK, 1992), p. 102.
[82] Fröhlich, “The Marriage of Henry VI and Constance of Sicily,” p. 103.
[83] Fröhlich, “The Marriage of Henry VI and Constance of Sicily,” pp. 106-107.
[84] Munz, Frederick Barbarossa, p. 366-367.
[85] This is not to say that the papacy has no interest in a peaceful Christian society, but rather that the political aims of the papacy in Italy were not advanced by such a union.
[86] Fröhlich, “The Marriage of Henry VI and Constance of Sicily,” p. 109.
[87] Haverkamp, Medieval Germany, p. 237.
[88] Jones, The Italian City-State: From Commune to Signoria, p. 338
[89] “His preferred road to success was the compromise which could act as a starting-point for further progress, and he was in this way often able to turn a military defeat into a political advantage, or at least avoid the worst of the consequences.” Fuhrmann, Germany in the High Middle Ages, p. 139
Bibliography coming soon.