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The Loss of Normandy
Ryan Renfro
When William the Bastard, duke of Normandy began the conquest of England in 1066, he lifted England from a Scandinavian world and brought it into a French one. Not only were William and his heirs the kings of England but the dukes of Normandy and therefore feudal vassals of the French kings as well. By the time of Richard’s death the English monarchy held most of western France from Normandy down to Gascony, much more than was directly under the control of the Capetian monarchs. Yet by 1214, Richard’s successor John had lost Normandy to Philip Augustus of France. Although the loss of Normandy has long been attributed to John’s own failures as a king, other factors such as the rise of the Capetian monarchy must not be overlooked. The loss of Normandy was just as much the result of the overextension of English possessions in France, the rise of the Capetians, and just plain bad luck as of any shortcomings of John.
Following the conquest of England, the Norman dukes established the strongest monarchy in Europe. They made extensive records to record their rights and for the exacting of taxes through offices such as the exchequer. The new Norman nobility had scattered possessions in England and after 150 years had lost many ties with Normandy. The situation in France, however, was quite different. The French king at the time of the Norman Conquest had very little power in France, holding a very modest royal demesne and although recognized by the French dukes and barons as an overlord, he possessed very little real power over his nobles.
The situation, however, had changed drastically by 1200. French kings such as Philip Augustus had been slowly building up the amount of lands they held direct authority over and using what few rights they had, primarily the institution of royal justice, to extend their influence in France. As the greatest landholder in France, the English king was destined to come into conflict with a French king intent upon increasing his authority. Richard had spent most of his reign in France, fighting for his possessions and building castles to maintain control. Upon Richard’s death, John was able to secure Richard’s holdings in 1200 in the Treaty of Le Goulet in return for the recognition of Philip as overlord and 20,000 marks.[1] The role of one king, however, as the feudal vassal of another was somewhat of a problem as the subject king was apt not to eagerly fulfill his duties to the other, creating a situation at the beginning of John’s reign likely to lead to conflict.
The conflict came in 1202 when John was summoned to Philip’s court. John had had his first marriage to his cousin annulled and taken Isabelle, daughter of Count Ademar of Angoulêne, as his second wife in order to gain control of the Roman roads in her family’s lands. This was a bad move and one that John later came to regret since Isabelle was already betrothed to Hugh le Brun, a vassal of the lord of Lusignan. The Lusignans were outraged over the loss of a marriage that was to bring peace between the two families, appealing to Philip Augustus as their feudal overlord. Philip summoned John to his royal court in Paris in 1202. Thinking he could merely refuse on the basis that the duke of Normandy could only be called for a Norman border dispute, John refused to appear just as Henry II had done in 1152. Seeing an opportunity, the now more powerful Capetian king declared that John had to answer as the duke of Anjou and declared all John’s possessions in France forfeit and the possession of his nephew Arthur. Although Philip would have likely taken military action against John at some point anyway, this provided a justification for Philip in the eyes of his other barons who would have seen military aggression against John otherwise as an abuse of power. Although a conflict was already brewing, John displayed a lack of foresight in his marriage and refusal to attend Philip’s court that gave Philip an excuse to take Normandy.
John’s prospects appeared somewhat promising in 1202. Although his Rhineland allies had left for crusade and Emperor Otto I was too preoccupied with his rival Philip of Swabia to provide an eastern front, John had many castles, largely the work of Richard, and could effectively raise funding, an ability even his harshest critics acknowledge. When John received word that his mother, Eleanor of Aquitaine, was under siege at Mire beau Castle, John rushed an amazing 80 miles in 48 hours, surprising the besiegers and taking Arthur and the Lusignan brothers hostage.[2] This was a tremendous victory for John, one which forced Philip to march south from Normandy.
The gains made at Mire beau were lost, however, when William des Roches defected, apparently because John no longer accepted his council and had mistreated some of the hostages.[3] Brittany rose against John when rumors spread by Hubert de Burgh that Arthur, whom he held, was dead. In 1203 John did have Arthur killed, an action fully supported by Pope Innocent III because Arthur had lead an armed revolt against his overlord, but one which won John the enmity of much of the French nobility, some of whose sons John still held.[4] John now faced the Bretons in the West, William des Roches to the South in the middle of his French possessions and Philip in the East. The greatest threat to Normandy was that of Philip, who laid siege to Richard’s seemingly impregnable fortress, Château Gaillard. John orchestrated a magnificent plan to supply the castle involving both a land and water force but which ultimately failed due to poor timing. Kate Norgate refers to this venture as “magnificent,” writing that it displays “how mistaken are the charges of sloth and incapacity.”[5] Although he lacked the personal leadership qualities on the battlefield displayed by his brother Richard, John does show a continual ability to organize large military schemes. This scheme having failed due to nothing more than bad luck, John abandoned Gaillard to its fate and moved West into Brittany, opening up Normandy to Philip’s advances, which his nobles likely could have held had they not betrayed John for Philip. By June1204, Philip had taken all of Normandy and was moving into Anjou and Poitou.
When discussing the recapture of Normandy with John, William Marshal was reported as saying “Sire, you have not enough friends.”[6] The lack of baronial support was critical in John’s loss of Normandy: but why did they declare for Philip? First of all they were largely indifferent to the whole conflict and desired peace after years of warfare. John was known for using foreign mercenaries since he could not raise the troops needed in Normandy nor bring enough of his English vassals to France. Once in Normandy, these mercenaries often treated the local populace with as much hostility as they did in enemy territory, making the Normans bitter of the conflict. Furthermore, the Capetians had a reputation for good lordship that John could not match. Angevin rule in Normandy had been strict, the king demanding control over many of the castles, whereas the Capetians offered a much more decentralized form of rule in which the local lords were able to keep more power for themselves.[7] Unlike a century earlier, most of the Norman lords held lands in only Normandy as opposed to splitting their possessions between England and Normandy and would thus not stand to loose if Normandy were severed from England. The Norman bishops resented John as well due to his interference in elections and high taxes to support his military campaigns. Although John was never able to win the Normans over with a stunning military success or provide the sort of strong leadership of his brother or father, most of the reasons behind his abandonment by the Norman nobility were problems he inherited, having to due with the nature of Angevin rule and not an especially tyrannical rule by John.
The struggle over Normandy did not end in 1204. John, determined to retake it, organized the largest force that any French or English king had ever raised. He modified customs, finding many new ways to exact taxes in England. He reorganized the military, requiring one out of ten knights to fight with him wherever and for as long as he needed them, while the other nine supported that knight with funding.[8] He worked out a series of alliances with the counts of Boulogne and Flanders and Otto I who, fearing the growing power of the Capetian monarchy, were more than willing to support John. Not wanting to fight Philip in Normandy, John moved his army into his southern lands where he intended to defeat Philip decisively, thus showing the Normans his power. Unfortunately John had trouble convincing his Poitevin subjects to fight and they deserted him before he could meet Philip. The next disaster happened to John when Otto’s army was delayed in Flanders, meaning that Philip would have the chance to fight each army separately. This was all the advantage he needed, decisively defeating John at Bouvines on 27 July, 1214.[9]
Philip Augustus defeated John at Bouvines because once again, John was not able to coordinate two forces into a single attack. John’s plan was sound and demonstrated a tremendous ability to bring together and coordinate a large number of men and resources, but it failed due to the bad luck of having Otto’s forces being delayed in Flanders and “Poitevin undependability.”[10] Painter points out that Bouvines was the turning point: victory would have made John the most powerful ruler in Europe, but defeat would mean the permanent loss of Normandy.[11]
Although John lacked the charisma and prestige of his brother Richard that may have kept just enough support to allow him to maintain his grasp on Normandy, there was little which John did apart from his use of mercenaries that caused the loss of Normandy. John inherited vast estates in England and France which made conflict with the rising Capetian monarchy inevitable according to the Barnwell chronicler[12], and certainly a strong possibility. He faced nobles on both sides of the channel apathetic to his cause and weary of the burden it imposed upon them: Normans tired of the fighting and the presence of John’s mercenaries and English tired of paying for the wars and mercenaries. The extent of his territories was simple too big and his resources spread too thin to effectively repel enemies who could concentrate their forces.[13] John inherited a poor situation in Normandy, and was ultimately not able to provide the sort of stunning leadership required to maintain the support of his nobles.
Bibliography
Turner, Ralph V. King John. New York: Longman Publishing, 1994.
Warren, W. L. King John. London: Eyre Methuen, 1978.
Hollister, C. Warren. Medieval Europe; a short history. New York: Wiley, 1964.
[1] Warren, W.L. King John, p. 54.
[2] Turner, Ralph. King John, p. 120.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid, p. 121.
[5] Ibid, pp. 121-122.
[6] Ibid, p. 124.
[7] Ibid, p. 125.
[8] Ibid, p. 129.
[9] Ibid, p. 134.
[10] Ibid, pp. 134-135
[11] Ibid, p. 135.
[12] Ibid, p. 127.
[13] Warren, p. 89.