On the Role of the Normans in Relations Between East and West.

Ryan Renfro

            The eleventh and early twelfth centuries witnessed significant developments in the relations between East and West.  The death of Emperor Basil II left Byzantium vulnerable under a succession of weak rulers.  Much of Anatolia, the prime area of military recruitment, was lost to the Seljuk Turks, forcing Constantinople to turn towards mercenaries for protection.  This need was filled to a large degree by the Normans.  Circumstances in Normandy such as the lack of land for younger sons lead large numbers of Normans, such as the Hautevilles, to seek their fortunes abroad in Italy, Spain, England and Byzantium.  Although prized for their martial prowess, the Normans soon proved to be a threat to the empire once established in Italy, Sicily, and Antioch.  Although the Normans, particularly Robert Guiscard and his son, Bohemond, did much to spoil relations between East and West due to their unbridled ambition and deceitfulness, they were still prized and utilized by the Byzantines.  Furthermore, relations between the other western political and religious bodies and Constantinople do not seem to have been poisoned by the Normans as political diplomacy and ecumenical talks continued as before.

            Relations in the early part of the eleventh century were no more strained than at any other period.  The Photian controversy had burned out and the bulk of Byzantine force was aimed at the Balkans or the East.  Although Norman warriors were beginning to appear in southern Italy and Byzantium, with no real power they were of little threat.  Italy at this point was contested by a number of different powers: the Lombards, the papacy, the German and Byzantine emperors as well as the Muslims.  Norman knights, fresh from the Reconquest already underway in Spain and eager for more adventures and booty, found this situation simple irresistible. It was to Italy that many of them came; it was in Italy that the Hautevilles found their prize.

            Before delving into the new Norman state one should first look at the Normans who traveled to Byzantium.  The most prominent of these were the three leaders of the emperor’s Norman contingent: Robert Crispin, Hervé and Roussel of Bailleul.  Crispin came to Byzantium from Italy in 1066, heading the Norman mercenaries until he rebelled in 1069, plundering in Asia Minor because he did not receive his pay.  Instead of falling under harsh criticism for these actions, he was back fighting for the emperor at the Battle of Manzikert in 1071.[1]  The other two had similar careers, both holding the title vestiarite as well as land in fief from the emperor in Armenia.  Both were lead to desertion and eventually to the Turkish side by lack of payment and both died under Byzantine arrest. Although, as Van Houts writes, “eleventh-century Byzantine historians are unanimous in their verdict that these barbarians were utterly unreliable,”[2] the emperors clearly did not share their sentiments.  The emperors’ willingness to continue to Normans was due to two main factors.  The first of these is the empire’s apparent need of effective mercenaries.  The second is that the emperors did not regard the Normans as completely unreliable or else they would not have hired them.  In fact, many of the rebellions by Norman lords were due to the inability or refusal of the Byzantines to properly reward them, and they were no better than the native magnates and less likely to seek the throne for themselves.

            In order to understand the viewpoint of the emperors during this period one must understand the Normans themselves.  Like all mercenaries, the Norman’s prime motivation was their pockets.  They were driven by the lust for spoils; they were guaranteed to go where opportunity was the greatest and certain to betray any who could not provide as promised.  The emperors must have been fully aware of this and seem to have cut the Normans some slack when they demanded reimbursement.  Anna Comnena recounts that when Alexius pretended to blind Roussel of Bailleul, the emperor’s cousin admonished him “for having deprived a man so noble and a true hero of his sight,”[3] despite his former rebellions.  The Byzantines appear to have still respected the Normans despite their opportunism.

            Tensions between Normans and Byzantines began with Robert Guiscard’s sack of Bari in 1071.  Because Robert’s authority was unstable and his position as a warlord necessitated the constant acquisition of new territories to reward his men for their service, he was ready to look eastward for expansion.[4]  Meanwhile, the poor position of Michael VII caused him to seek a marriage alliance with Guiscard that would provide him with an ally to the west and mercenaries, proposing it first in 1071 as “the consequence of having the same confession and faith.”[5]  It was not until Pope Gregory VII planned a military expedition against Guiscard that he accepted the offer in 1074.  This displays a common trait of relations in this period in that the Byzantines were forced to deal with the reality of Norman power and sought to bring them into the Byzantine sphere of influence.

            This treaty, however, did not last.  Robert, spurred forward by desire of land for his men and eldest son, Bohemond, took advantage of Alexius’ takeover of power to put forth an imposter of Michael III to gain papal and Greek support.[6]  Robert and Bohemond crossed the Adriatic in 1081 to besiege and take Dyrrhachium before pillaging Epirus, Macedonia and Thessaly.  Forced to return to guard against Henry IV, whom Alexius had enticed into invading Italy, Robert left Bohemond in charge until his return in 1084.  This time he faced the Venetians as well, to whom Alexius had granted titles and the right of free trade in all areas except the black sea in return for support against Guiscard.  Beaten by the combined forces, Robert returned to Italy, dying the next year in 1085.  Although the invasions by Robert’s forces threatened the emperor himself,[7] they did no more serious damage to East-West relations as a whole than any other number of events.  This is evident in the Byzantine’s willingness to ally themselves with the papacy, the German emperor and the Venetians against Guiscard.

            The second major conflict between the Normans and the Byzantines came during the First Crusade.  At first requesting the rank of Domestic and discouraging Tancred from attacking the Byzantines, Bohemond realized that his best chances at establishing himself would be without and even in spite of the Byzantines when they respectfully declined their old enemy’s request according to McQueen.[8]  Although Bohemond swore an oath of fealty to the emperor along with most of the other leaders, he soon looked for a way out of it once Antioch had been captured.  Refusing to honour it once, Alexius did not live up to his promise to come to the crusaders aid, a decision made due to false information by a retreating Frank.  Bohemond was once again at odds with Alexius.  To the Byzantines this situation was intolerable.  Not only had Bohemond broken his oath and was now holding rightful Byzantine territory, including the former third city of the empire, in his hands.  Alexius’ old adversary was on either side of him and he had no options left but war.[9]  Following a defeat against the Turks, Bohemond returned to the West in 1105 to mount an attack against Byzantium much like his father had done.  Despite Bohemond’s large force and the support of Pope Paschal II, Alexius was prepared for Bohemond and defeated him as he took roughly the same approach as twenty years earlier.  Despite Bohemond’s previous betrayal, Alexius allowed him to retain Antioch under the Treaty of Devol in 1108 in which Bohemond became Alexius’ vassal, holding any former Byzantine territory under the emperor.  Whether or not this shows Alexius’ wishes to make amends with the Normans or his inability to fully recover Antioch from the Normans is in this case not as important as the fact that East-West relations had not been pushed to the breaking point by Norman ambition.

            What evidence is there that the Normans, particularly Robert and Bohemond, hand not done irrevocable damage to relations?  As previously mentioned, the Byzantines displayed a continual desire to form alliances with other powers in the West, particularly Venice.  In hindsight this alliance with Venice may have done more damage to relations than the failed attempts by Robert and Bohemond since the granting of free trade to Venice enriched the Venetians, created resentment among Byzantine merchants and resulted in the loss of massive long-term revenues for the Byzantine state.  By the second half of the eleventh century the political reality was that Byzantium was less the invincible eastern empire but instead more of an equal Mediterranean power competing with western states.  This change of role necessitated such alliances if the emperor was going to hold on to his throne.

            Another indication that the Norman did not cause the final blow to Byzantine relations with the West is the number of Normans still in Byzantine service.  The position and birth of some is key.  Apart form the obvious fact that Bohemond was kept in the emperor’s service, several of his relatives provided loyal support to the Byzantines.  Humbertopoulos, whom Anna calls a “fine soldier,”[10] supported Alexius in taking the throne and received the rank of Domestic for his service.  He was also Guiscard’s nephew.  As with the response to Bohemond’s unfaithfulness, Alexius intervened to save Humbertopoulos from “the extreme penalty demanded by the laws.”[11]  When Guiscard died in 1085 many of his Norman followers, including his son, Guy, found employment in the East.  Guy received gifts, money, and the emperor’s niece for his service.[12]  Additionally, as late as Bohemond’s last invasion Normans such as William of Gleret were defecting to Byzantium.  The defections occurred because the Normans thought they could fine better opportunity under the emperor, yet they would not have happened had the emperor refused the idea of employing westerners and thus not pursued their service.  Instead, Alexius always attempted to lure individual Normans into defection or rebellion.  The fact that Bohemond’s relatives seem to have been present with the emperor at the signing of the Treaty of Devol seems to indicate the Norman’s value to the emperor, even those related to one of his principle foes.

            The other prime factor one must examine in determining the state of relations between East and West is the state of the Church.  Browning writes that “Disagreement on the question of papal supremacy was exacerbated by the menacing attitude adopted towards Byzantium by [the Normans of Southern Italy].”[13]  Although Latin invasions of Byzantine territory and the investment of a Latin patriarch in Antioch by the Normans certainly did nothing to further Greek attitudes towards westerners, they were poor before the Normans took front stage.  The controversy over papal primacy and questions of empire had plagued relations for many years, culminating in the schism of 1054.  To what extent then was the damage caused by the Hautevilles?  To answer this one must look toward Byzantine relations with the papacy.

            Although the excommunication had come indirectly from the first reform pope Leo IX, Gregory VII seemed genuinely interested in reconciliation between the two halves of Christendom.[14]  Although Guiscard receives much of the blame for spoiling these relations, it was in part Gregory’s dispute with Henry IV of Germany which drove him to seek Guiscard as an ally.  Although his invasion of the Balkans hardened Greek attitudes, it is as unlikely that the Greek clerics would be willing to accept papal supremacy and actual rights over other bishops and their dioceses as it is that the reform papacy would surrender these rights.  Even so, negotiations continued.  Patriarch Nicholas III asked Urban II to send a confession of faith that, if orthodox, would place his name into the diptychs while representatives discussed reunion at a synod at Bari in 1098.  “Urban’s plan was thus wrecked by the selfishness of a Norman adventurer [Bohemond].”[15]  Although Bohemond may be the immediate cause for the breakdown in negotiations at this point, he was not the core problem.  Alexius later approached Paschal II, offering church union if he would proclaim him sole Roman emperor; a similar offer was made by Emperor John to Pope Calixtus II.[16]   Thus while the Normans caused a breakdown in negotiations and a polarization of attitudes, the core differences of the schism remained and any progress was bound to be short lived.

            Despite Norman deceit, ambition and attacks on Byzantine, they did not bear the burden of spoiling relations between Byzantium and the West alone.  They were needless to state a contributing factor; however the religious, cultural, and ideological differences where at the heart of the breakdown.  If any one event could be blamed for poisoning relations, it would be the sack of Constantinople in 1204, for it was then that the schism was finalized and Greek resentment to aggressive western force brought to a pinnacle.  It was Alexius’ ally, not his enemy, who stuck the final blow.

Bibliography

Browning, Robert.  The Byzantine Empire.  Washington D.C.:  The Catholic University

of America Press, 1992.

Hollister, C. Waren.  Medieval Europe: A Short History.  San Francisco: MacGraw-Hill,

1998.

Hussey, J.M., ed.  The Cambridge Medieval History, vol iv: i.  London: Cambridge

University Press, 1979.  

McQueen, W.B.  “Relations between the Normans and Byzantium, 1071-1112.” 

Byzantion, 56 (1986), pp. 427-76.

Van Houts, E.M.C.  “Normandy and Byzantium in the Eleventh Century.”  Byzantion, 55