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The Union of 1707: Why the Scottish Parliament Endorsed It.
Beginning in 1689, the year in which the Convention of Estates issued the Claim of Right, providing for among other things the regular meeting of the Scottish Parliament, Scotland set off in a direction that would ultimately lead the English state to coerce it into a union of parliaments. Although it accepted William as king, the Scots Parliament passed legislation of a very independent nature, culminating in the Acts of Settlement and anent Peace and War, both of which were perceived as being in conflict with English interests.[1] When the Scots Parliament established its right to declare the Scottish monarch in the Act of Security in 1703-4, threatening the Hanoverian succession in Scotland, the Westminster government knew that something must be done. Westminster replied with the Alien Act, banning the importation of Scottish black cattle, sheep, coal, and linen unless the Act of Security was appealed by December 1705. Seeking to end its troubles concerning succession and foreign affairs, Westminster offered the Scots a deal they could hardly refuse. Although a variety of factors from the managerial system to threats of English invasion lead the Scots Parliament to accept the Treaty of Union of 1707, the primary factors were economic in nature.
The Scottish economy was in poor shape in the years preceding the Act of Union. As illustrated by the studies of T.C. Smout, the Scottish economy had shown grown throughout the seventeenth century up until 1680; however, half of Scottish exports were to England by that time.[2] With an economy lagging behind that of Ireland, Scotland produced mostly low quality goods which where in no great demand in other regions and thus the majority of Scottish exports lay in raw materials such as coal or cattle which were for practical purposes traded primarily with England. This gave the Westminster parliament a significant power over the fragile, inflexible Scottish economy, a power which it took full advantage of when it threatened to ban Scotland’s four largest export products in 1705. The Alien Act of 1705 displayed to the Scottish parliament Westminster’s willingness and ability to decimate the Scottish economy if they did not conform to England’s desires.
Two other events at the turn of the eighteenth century made the economic situation in Scotland all the more grim. The first was the disastrous Darien Scheme to establish a trading colony on the Isthmus of Darien. When this failed due to disease and the Spanish navy, it is estimated that Scotland lost as much as a quarter of its liquid capital.[3] Furthermore, Scottish entrepreneurs would certainly be henceforth much more cautious about investing in foreign trade, taking their money instead to London, where any trading would have the backing of the British navy. The Scottish economy was further damaged by a number of crop failures beginning in 1695. The result of this Dearth was that yet more Scottish capital flowed out of the country to purchase food supplies. As a result of these two catastrophes the Scottish economy was in urgent need of care, a fact that did not escape the Parliament in 1707.
Their nation in a state of economic crisis, the members of the Scots Parliament were given the Treaty of Union by a commission of English and Scottish representatives containing only one anti-unionist, George Lockhart of Carnwath.[4] Seen by many throughout the ages as a bribe by the English in return for Scottish sovereignty, the treaty contained many economic benefits for the Scots. Indeed, Articles IV through XV are concerned with economic matters such as trade, taxation, and the payment of debt- all of a beneficial nature to the Scots. The Scots would gain free trade with England; access to the British Empire; the same value currency, an English pound being worth fourteen times as much as a Scots pound; reimbursement of the sums lost in the Darien Scheme with five percent interest a year plus a number of exemptions from English duties and other measures designed to protect Scottish industry. Matters of sovereignty aside, this was a tremendously generous offer from the English government. Everyone in the Scots parliament was certainly aware of the economic benefit of such articles and only nineteen of the staunchest anti-unionists could oppose Article IV calling for “full Freedom and Intercourse of Trade and Navigation.”[5] This number displays the insight of the Earl of Roxburghe’s famous words, “The motives will be, Trade with most, Hanover with some, ease and security with others…intolerable poverty and…constant oppression.”[6] It was undeniable that Scotland would have benefited from such Articles and this must surely have weighted in the minds of many of the Scots Parliament members.
Many historians, particularly anti-unionist ones, emphasize the economic benefits to a select few, claiming “the opportunities sought were invariably for the economic growth of Scotsmen rather than the economic growth of Scotland.”[7] The charge is bribery and the idea is as old as the Union itself, Robert Burns later writing that Scotland was “bought and sold for English gold.”[8] Various historians have come up with specific charges; P.H. Scott has accused the Duke of Hamilton, a very influential anti-unionist, among others of having his debts paid by the Westminster government.[9] Ferguson points out that the payment of arrears of salary to members of Parliament was based on their backing of the Treaty, their vote being necessary to secure the money due them.[10] Patent bribery, however, was not the only way in which parliament could be convinced to support the treaty. Many of the economic benefits of the treaty itself were especially beneficial to a small group of wealthy peers such as a continuation of the prohibition of Irish grain.[11] Whether this can be seen as a form of bribery or not is left to individual interpretation, although it is only logical that the wealthiest in Scottish society stood to gain the most from the economic benefits from the treaty since they held most of the property to begin with. Perhaps even more important to the peers in Parliament, however, was the extension of the rights of the English nobility to their Scottish equivalents. In debt to a large degree from the failed Darien Scheme, the freedom from debtor’s prison must have seemed an attractive benefit to any Scottish nobleman at this time. Corrupt politicians or principled men voting the in interests of their county, the Scots Parliament members were undoubtedly lured toward union by the tremendous economic benefits of the treaty.
Historians such as Ferguson, however, try to downplay the role of economics in favour of other factors. Ferguson points to three major factors in the parliament’s acceptance of the Treaty: the role of political management, bribery, and divided and ineffective opposition.[12] He is right to point out the importance of political factors, and is backed by Macinnes, who writes: “political affiliations based on adherence to party were measurably the most cohesive, comprehensive and cogent influences on voting.”[13] The temptation to remain true to one’s party and patron would have been just as influential as ever and must not be overlooked in determining why the Scots Parliament voted the way it did. Riley supports Macinnes claim by noting that most members remained in faithful to their political affiliation.[14] Scotland was in 1707 under the management of Mar, whose leadership was instrumental in passing the treaty according to Ferguson.[15] It should, however, be noted that despite appearing to be political factors, voting in accordance to the wishes of a political manager is just as much an economic factor, since under the patronage system one voted in a specific manner in order to win favours from ones patron.
Are there any non-economic factors that would have motivated the Scots parliament to accept the treaty? First of all there is anti-Jacobite sentiment, motivating some to distance themselves from feelings of rebellious Scottish nationalism and toward England and the Hanoverian dynasty. There were also a number of Episcopalians in the Scots Parliament who would have felt much more comfortable in a union with the primarily Anglican English than left alone with Scottish Presbyterians.[16] Finally and most importantly, there lingered the threat of English invasion. Although the peoples of Scotland successfully repelled invasions by the English and Romans in previous centuries, Cromwell had proven earlier in the seventeenth century that Scotland would be no match for a well-trained English army. The Scots parliament knew that Westminster would have its way one way or another, and there must have been great pressure to take the quite munificent terms offered in the Treaty of Union.
Historians have voiced doubts that all members of the Scots Parliament viewed union as something universally beneficial to the Scottish economy. They have pointed out that economic concerns were at the head of the “pamphlet war” which raged in cities such as Edinburgh as Parliament considered the treaty, thus proving that it was not immediately apparent that Scotland would benefit from the union. There were fears that creating the largest free trade zone in Europe would ruin small Scots manufacturers incapable of competing with their English counterparts. This, however, was accounted for in the treaty itself: Articles such as Article IX and X are aimed at protecting Scottish industries such as salt, fish, and paper which would not be able to compete initially. Furthermore, any who would doubt the blatancy of the treaty’s benefits to the Scottish economy would have to explain why only nineteen votes could be raised in opposition to Article IV, allowing freedom of trade and navigation. Still others would point out that economic concerns played only a minor role in the debates preceding the ratification of the treaty. Whatley, however, counters this argument by writing: “As the Scottish parliament had little option to surrender to what was in effect economic blackmail, it does not seem surprising that these issues did not dominate the negotiations.”[17] They did not need to discuss the benefits because they were largely self-evident. This passage also illustrates the inevitability of the treaty’s ratification: once presented, the Scottish Parliament had to accept it since no other practical solutions to the contemporary economic crisis could be offered.
Although the threat of being disbanded by force by an English government troubled by the latest actions taken by it lingered over the Scottish Parliament, it was surely economic factors which convinced the members at Holyrood to accept the Treaty of Union. Although Smout admits, as any cautious historian would, that in the end one cannot ultimately determine what convinced any one member to vote in the manner he did, the situation in 1707 points chiefly to economic factors as the reason behind the Treaty of Union’s ratification.[18]
Bibliography
Ferguson, William. Scotland: 1689 to the Present. Edinburgh: Mercat Press, 1997.
Smout, T. C. A History of the Scottish People 1560-1830. London: Fontana Press, 1998.
Whatley, Christopher A. ‘Bought
and Sold for English Gold’? Explaining the Union of
1707. Dundee: The Economic and Social History Society of Scotland, 1994.
Whatley, Christopher A. “Economic Causes and Consequences of the Union of 1707: A
Survey.” The Scottish Historical Review, vol lxviii, 2. pp 150-181.
[1] Whatley, Christopher A. ‘Bought
and Sold for English Gold?’ Explaining the Union of
1707, p. 11.
[2] Whatley, Christopher A. “Economic
Causes and Consequences of the Union of 1707: A Survey.”
p. 152.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ferguson, William. Scotland: 1689 to the Presnet, p. 47.
[5] Whatley. The Scottish Historical Review, p. 158.
[6] Ibid, p. 153.
[7] Ibid, p. 165.
[8]Whatley. Bought and Sold for English Gold, p. 16
[9] Ibid. pp. 19-20.
[10] Ferguson, p. 49.
[11] Whatley. Bought and Sold for English Gold, p. 42.
[12] Whatley. The Scottish Historical Review, p. 155.
[13] Whatley. Bought and Sold for English Gold, p. 24.
[14] Whatley. The Scottish Historical Review, p. 155.
[15] Ferguson, p. 49.
[16] Whatley. The Scottish Historical Review, p. 153.
[17] Whatley. The Scottish Historical Review, p. 157.
[18] Smout writes: “You can describe how you take a horse to the water, but you cannot describe what goes on in his head while he is drinking.” Whatley. The Scottish Historical Review, p. 153.